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After World War II the revival o f the spirit of nationalism led
to the emergence of many new states.

Freed from the colonial domination ,

the new states were keenly int erested in developing their societies as
.
fast as possible.

Many problems stand in the way o f development.

These

problems are the problems of stability, unity, integration and socioeconomic problems.
This study is concerned about the problems of political development in Bangladesh , which came into existence in 1 9 7 1 , as a result of the
problems o f of national integration in Pakistan.

This study identifies

some problems which stand in the way of political development in Bangladesh.

These problems are:

( 1 ) the problems o f integration, (2) the

problems of unity and stability, ( 3 ) the lack of well-organized political
parties, (4) the problems of bureaucracy, and ( 5 ) socio-economic problems.
After the creation of Bangladesh it was assumed that there would
be no problem of integration in Bangladesh.

But an analysis o f the poli-

tical situations will show that problems of integration still remain ,
though in different character, such as the lack of integration between
'

the

elites and the mass, the lack of integrative ideology, the separa-

tist tendency in the tribal people, etc.

Absence of stability is creating

problems in the effective undertaking o f any developmental plan.
causes of instability are:

The chief

factionalism, frustration of the people, threat

of India , loss of charisma, etc .

Too many political parties with too many

ideologies stand in the way of creating a stable government.

The parties

do not have any organizational basis , and are based on the personality of
the leader.

The parties are not effective in aggregating the peoples'

demands and grievances.

The lack of balance in the role of the bureaucracy

2
is also a problem.

On the one hand, if the bureaucrats are given more

power, they hinder the growth of political institutions .

On the other

hand, if they are given less p�wer, they play an inac t ive role hindering
the execution of policies.

Bangladesh suffers from both the problems of

bureaucracy.
The most pre-dominant problems which hamper political development
in Bangladesh are socio-economic problems.

The population problem, food

problem, and unemployment create mass frustrations causing instability
and disunity within the country.
hinders the way of change.

The attachment to the traditional values

This study analyzes in detail all these prob

lems and how they stand in the way of political development.
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.CHAPTER I
PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH

Introduction

After World War II the revival of the spirit of nationalism led
to the emergence of many new states.

Freed from the colonial domination

the new states were keenly interested in developing their societies as·
quickly as possible.

Many problems stand in the way of developmen t .

The

most formidable problems of political development are the problems of
stability , unity, integration and socio-economic problems of development .
In this study, we will try to identify the problems of political
development in Bangladesh.
to 1971 .

Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan from 1947

In 1947, British India was given independence with the creation

of Pakistan, which consisted of West Pakistan and Bangladesh .
'

Bangladesh came into existence through succession from Pakistan.

The

study of Bangladesh marks a new trend in the politics of the developing
areas.
As a new-born country, it is filled with many problems of a political, social and economic nature.

This study will analyze the political

and socio-economic problems of Bangladesh by describing the problems and
analyzing their causes.
Hopefully-, this study will serve as a useful guide to understanding
the problems of an emerging country.

1

Political development is the chief
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concern of the new states of Asia and Africa.

But an analysis of the

politics of the developing areas will show that many problems stand in
the way of political development .

The goals of political development

i s very much frustrated by the problems of stability, unity and socio
economic problems.

By studying this, we can get an idea of the problems

facing a new state .
This study will be helpful for understanding the problems of poli
tical integration , stability and economic development .
of political development is economic.
the solution of economic problems.

The real problem

The greatest skill is dependent on

Though the developing countries are

often led by a charismatic leader, unless he can resolve economic problems
he is bound to fade away very soon.

If these problems are not solved,

people ·rise in revolution, which leads to political instability, d i sunity
and disintegration.

Meaning of Political Development
The term "political development" i s a very elusive concept .

There

i s no consensus among the political scientists regarding the concept of
political development.

Political development is termed as change, but

change has taken place in a variety of ways.

Moreover, the concept o f

political development i s very transitory in character.

What was regarded

a s political development in the 1960' s i s regarded as politi�ally under
developed in the 1970 ' s.
i s fast changing.

As such the conception of political development

Rostow and L. Pye fashion their conception of "political

development" around the notion of national political unity and broadening

3

base of political participation.

1

Pye , in addition to emphasizing the

need for stregnthening of national interests at the expense of parochial
concerns at the local or regional leve l , also argues that there ought to
be effective coordination between administrative and political groups and
institutions which are very weak and not very articulate .
E. E. Hegen, in exploring the possibilities for a framework for

analyzing economic and political development takes account of "deep seated
resistence to social change and of the need for changing some rather basic
attitudes .

11

2

He speaks �f J::e sistence, 'that is ·to say, t·r�ditional values

and ideas that stand fn,the way of any �hange towards·development .
is a sociologist.

Hegen

So, he analyz�s�political development from.th� point of

social value , : .nort.n� ,·;�t;c .
.

Gabriel Almond defined political development as "the acquisition
by a political system of a new capability in the sense of a specialized
role structure and differentiated orientation s , which together give a
political system the possibility of responding efficientiy and more or
3
less autonomously to a new range of problem s . " ,
abilities for a politically developed society:

He speaks of four cap
(1) integrative capability ,

i . e . , the creation of national unity and centralized bureaucracy ,

(2) inter-

national accommodative capability, i . e . , ability to engage in international
contacts of various governments , (3) participation capability, i . e . , creation of a political culture of civic obligation and of a democratic poli-

1
Alfred Diamond , "Political Development: Appt:oaches to Theory
and Strategy ," New York: McGraw-Hil l Book Company , 1966, p . 20 .
2
3

Ibid . , p . 21.
Ibid.
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tical structure, and (4) welfare or distributive capability , i . e., widespread d issemination of welfare standards and accommodation between
political social structure.
Welch defines political development as "the development of an
institutional framework that ·i s sufficiently flexible and powerful to
meet the demands placed upon it . "

4

In shor t , the government must be

fully capable of performing a wide variety of duties.

Its capabilities

must increase so that change can be accommodated within political channels.

Political modernization is linked with economic growth and with

social and psychological changes for the obvious reason that the capacity
of a government to deal with demands is affected by economic an9 cultural
factors.
The process of political modernization has three characteristics:

( 1 ) an increased centralization of power in the state coupled with the
weakening of traditional sources o f authority, (2) the differentiation
and specificity of political institutions, and (3) increased popular participation in politics and greater identification of individuals with the
•

political system as a whole.
In a more analytical way Huntington states that four characteristics of political development are referred to most commonly:

( 1 ) ration-

alization, (2) national integration, (3) democratization, and (4) participation.

Paekenham takes a functional view of moderization and with some

qualifications, identifies political development with it.

Political

4
claude E. Welch, Political Moderization: A Reader in Comparative
Political Change (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc . , 1969), p. 7 .

5
development according to him "is the will and the capacity to cope with
and generate cont inuing transformation toward modernization while main
taining basic ind ividual freedom . 11

5

All these definitions reflect the same thing of political development .

"The popular idea of a developed country is one that is able to pro-

vide its c itizens with goods and services roughly equivalent to the highest
level of goods and services available in any country at that time.11

6

Indices of development range from per capita income through various ratios
of fuel consump t ion, railroads, telephones, televis ion sets, teacher s , students, l iteracy and death.
Indices of political development are less tangible and convenient .
Perhaps the best way to approach polit ical development is in t erms of the
role the political system must play if the society as a whole is to enjoy
the standard of living and other benefits generally associated with a
modern industrialized society.

Monte Palmer mentioned three areas for

character izing political development.

First, the political system must be

in a position to effectively control the popul�tion and resources of the
country.

Second , the polit ical system in developing areas must increasingly

bear responsibility for modernizat ion of their stat e's human and mater ial
resources .

The economic and social problems facing the developing areas

are beyond the point at which private enterprise is willing to provide

�Von Der Mehden, Politics of the Developing Nations (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1969), p. 6 .
6Gerald A . Regen, The Politics of Underdevelopment (New York:
Martin!s ·Pres s , 1974 ) , p p . 1-2.

St.

adequate solutions.

Third, the pol itical sys tem must successfully accom-

modate the demands occasioned by economic and social change without surrendering its role of control and mobil ization.

Too frequently developing

areas have s truggled to attain a substantial record of economic growth
only to see their economies s tagnate because of their inability to cope
with the conflict and social d isorganization precip itated thereby .

A

sys tem that cannot cope with the changes that it generates cannot be cons idered pol itically developed.
We can define a politically developed soc iety as one which has
stability, orderly ways of change, effectiveness, higher rate of economic
growth, ins titutionalized institutions , groups with fractional specialization, unity and consensus.in its fundamental ways and goals, legitimacy
of its government, popular participation balance between d ifferent sectors
of the soc iety.

Problems
•

Political development has become the chief concern o f the new
states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
in its wake a lot of problems.

But po litical development creates

The process of modernization involves change

in the structure of society in its attitudinal framework and in its capacity to respond effec tively to the problems imposed upon the sys tem.

It

involves the shift from ·a predominantly rural agr icultural soc iety to an
increasingly urban, industrial soc iety characterized by a cash and market
economy, occupational differentiation, high literacy and media access.
The parochial world of tradition is p enetrated by mass support and communi-
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cations facilities .

The ascriptive determination of status by b irth gives

way to ach ievement or ientations .

The identity horizon of the ind ividual

expands beyond the particularistic loyalties of family , village and tribe
to include increasingly universal and secular values.
The process of change creates new problems which are difficult for
the pol itical sys tem to cope with.

The character and d irection of change

will be the product of a dialectical interaction between tradition and
modernity as each inf iltrates and transforms the other.

The relationship

between tradition and modernity, the degree to which tradition is accommodated in the process of change, the ways it responds to the challenge of
modernization , is a critical determinant of s tability and development.
The forces of tradition may buy short term stability at the price of revolution but a failure to accept the context of tradition, to use traditional
s tructures as the vehicles of change may so undermine stabil ity as to prevent the development of the institutional capacity to fulfill the promise
of transformation.
"The process of change will give rise

to

new political demands

which may strain the l imited capac ity of the sys tem that institutionalization becomes increasingly difficult as partic ipation expands.

The process

of modernization may unleash a revolution of rising frustrations as the
gap widens between asp irations and ach ievements."

7

Regional linguistic

and cultural minorities may become more self-conscious and as primoridal
id entifications are injected into political life, traditional communities

7

Helio Jaquaribe, Political Development: A General Theory and
a Latin American Case Study (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973) ,
p . 207.

B

may take on the modern form o f tribe and associations or of movements
advocating separatism or linguistic nationalism.

Conflict increases as

new groups become participants but i f they lack the minimum consensus
necessary for the ordered resolution of conflict, the political system
may be unable to accommodate expanded participation by means of its institutions.
The primary problem of politics writes Samuel P . Huntington "is
the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and
.

economic change . "

8

The stability and development of any political system

depends on the relationship between political institutionalization and
political participation.

As partlc�p at·ion expands, the capacity of the

political institutions to absorb change must also increase if stability
is to be maintained.

The elites o f the ·new states stimulate the formation

of demands in the process of inducing social change.

Development programs

may seek to create felt needs within one traditional society in order to
facilitate innovation, but in an environment of scarcity, resources are
limited and the system will be most responsive to those commanding politi'

cal capital, wealth , status, votes.

Traditional elites may be reinforced

to ensure stability and to suppress widening popular involvement.

Repres-

sive rule s upplants democratic response in the name of order, however,
rather than through higher levels of institutionalization in response to
expanding participation may be the harbinger of chaos .
Development defined a s increasing institutionalization in response
to expanding participation may require a dynamic gap between the two variables .

With participat ion somewhat beyond the capacity of the instit utions

81bid . , p . 195.

9
to respond, the attempt to close the gap serves as the stimulus to higher
levels of institutionalization.

The interaction between institutionali-

.
zation and participation bet w;een order and response thus involv�s a
staggered process of development as each reacts to the other .

Beyond a

critical range, however, an imbalance may be increasingly difficult to
correc t .

Over-ins titutionalization i s conducive to the establishment o f

repressive order; participation far beyond institutional capacity may
foster unacceptable instability and political decay.
In the process of change there arises the problem of cultural lag.
In s ituations of rapid change, the harmony between structure and attitudes
that exists in traditional societies is replaced by discontinuity or disharmony referred to as cultural lag.
societies go far beyond cultural lag.
discontinuities . 11 9

"The discontinuities faced by changing
There are different sources o f these

First, different segments of the population are sub-

jected to differ ing pressures for change .
urban areas .

These pressures are intense in

Discontinuous rates of change , in turn, result in discon-

tinuous att itudes, loyalties, value. expe.ctat:iQn among v�r'lous poimlat:(.Qn
'

segments,

Such. d i.scontinu:lties pose. one. of the. Jll&jor iJl}ped!ments to poli.. �

tical deve.lopment .
S e.cond , d iscontinuities occur b e.cause d iff e.rent groups witlrln a
state. are. more prone to change than others .

Based on his study of Uganda ,

David Apter suggests that complex or highly differentiated tribes, such. as
the. Buganda, are. better able to absorb �nd accommodate change inputs than

9
Monte J:>a imer, The Dilemmas of Political Deve.lopment : An Intro
duction to the Politics of the Developing Areas (Illinois : F. E. Peacock
Publishers, Inc . , 1 9 7 3 ) , p . 1 .
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their poorly differentiated counterparts.

In the case of the former,

tribal loyalties and belief systems are left very much intact.

In the

latter, pressures for change result in structural breakdown and in the
concomitant disruption of the individual's values and his attitudes
toward change.
Third, discontinuities in attitudes and loyaltj\patterns result
from the variety of individual responses to the conflicts and ambiguities
characteristic of rapidly changing environments.

One response to this

dilemma has been to minimize insecurity by withdrawal and non-involvement.
Another response is the proliferation of religious and other tradition
oriented voluntary associations designed to compensate for the erosion of
traditional beliefs.

A related response has been to find security or

mobility via the path of total commitment to future-oriented nationalist,
socialist or communist movements.

These and similar responses further

contribute to the heterogeneity of values and loyalties with which poli
tical leaders in developing states must cope.
Another problem is that the social control mechanisms are breaking
down faster than they can be replaced by modern control techniques.
Fifth, the erosion of traditional social structures and increased
mobility associated with accelerated change means that increasingly smaller
segments of the population are becoming predisposed toward, and available
for recruitment into various political movements.

If political stability

is to be found, this increased politicization of the masses must be dir
ected toward identification with the dominant regime and its values.
Another problem is the new states are poorly educated.
imperfect information about the universe.

There is

The values of the ga�e-role

11
definitions and expectations about the behavior of others are poorly
defined and frequently subj ect to change.

Economic s ecurity is minimal .

The conflicting demands of political, economic , ethnic ' and religi.ous
groups are f requently difficult to r econcile.
The bureaucracies are beset by problems of nepotism, by rigidity
and lack of innovation b ehavior and by a deficient s ense of social responsibility.

Industrial workers are lazy, non-innovative, sluggish, peasant-

oriented, undisciplined , unproductive, and subject to frequent absenteeism.
"The image of rising expectation creates problems for political
d evelopmen t .

T h e modern government has to mobilize the resources of the

country for undertaking large scale d evelopment programs .

In order to

satisfy the popular demands the modernizing r egimes have to choose between
conspicuous spending for welfare-type proj ects on one hand and long range
infra-structure industrial d evelopment on the other . "

10

The former means

sport palaces, opera houses, cradle to grave s ecurity programs , palatial
buildings, hero statues and short run measures d esigned to create or
reinforce the legitimacy of a r egion.

The latter may often disrupt normal

consumption patterns by necessitating austerity programs and import, export
and currency r estrictions .

The long range development programs may d elay

prof its that do little to gratify the i mmediate needs of the population
or to counter promises of immediate gratification off ered by opposition
group s .

10
.
Robert L. Hargrave, Jr . , India Government and Politics in a
Developing Nation (New York: Harcour t , Brace and World , Inc . , 1970), p . 4 .
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As regimes or their predecessors opt for short-run conspicuous
spending, vital capital resources are diverted from infra-structure
development essential for long-range economic development and mass
demands and expectations are stimulated.

The more mass demands are

aroused the more difficult the imposition of austerity and other restrictive measures becomes and the greater the temptation to embark upon an
escalating cycle of promises and conspicuous programs which leave basic
economic and social problems unresolved.

The growing problems lead to

the assumption of power by the military which also suffers from factionalization resulting from value discontinuities and personality conflicts.
Because of more problems, control becomes the chief concern of the modernizing society, which compels the modern regimes to divert key developmental resources toward the control function, thereby crippling their
Political instability

ability to achieve their modernization goals.

leads to severe disruption in the planning,·promUl:·gati
· on and application
of development programs; to decreased confidence in the government; to
the increased unwillingness of private investors to invest in the long,

range projects; to the postponement of solutions to major problems; and
to the stimulation of competitive bidding among elites, thereby increasing
mass expectations and deman ds.
Monte Palmer speaks of different problems of political development.

11

First, the severe

heterogeneity of political attitudes and values

and the inability of most governmental institutions to meet the popular
There is much opposition to the regimes.

demands.

11

Monte Palmer, ££.• cit. , p. 6 2 .
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Second,

there is the problem of the heterogeneity in the politi-

cal values of the major political elites,

i.e.,

those who through legal

or extra-legal means are in a position to either control or heavily
influence government policies.
the political elites,

Because of the difference of values of

there will be no consistency in the developmental

programs and policies.
Third, bureaucracies of developing areas are seldom perceived as
impartial by incoming regimes,

particularly where value orientations

differ markedly from one regime to the next.

As a result,

regimes are

prone to interfere in the bureaucracy in an effort to reward their own
supporters and to eliminate individuals perceived as hostile.
of this interference is that the planning,

The result

implementing and coordinating

of development projects lacks continuity and is subject to frequent and
severe disruptions.

Also,

the lack of sufficient insulation from the

arena of political conflict reduces the willingness of administrators to
take the initiative necessary for the ongoing operation of the government
for fear of ·retribution.
Peter

H . Merkl mentions different problems of political develop-

ment such as:

1.

Problems of Unity and Consensus:

The problems of

unity and consensus are partly geographical and
partly social.

The problems of nation-building

and economic development are greatly complicated
where there are geographical barriers as the
separateness of East and West Pakistan or the
islands of Indonesia.

There is also social

differences based on language,

ethinicity, blood,

which stand in the way of unification.

Due to the

disunity the basic consensus on the form of govern
ment, the roles of the political process,

coDllllon

concepts of justice or day by day policies at home
and abroad. are ·,,not esta.b.lishe'i:J!.': ·� i:��r�. i� ·.a��ays
bitterness in the.. �ocj.C!"� �nd economic
..

field.

·
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2.

Problems of Stability and Effectiveness: The
developing countries are beset with the problem
of stability atid effectiveness. There is no
orderly change in government. The government
does not have the capacity to solve the ever
increasing problems.

3.

Problems of Communication Between Leadership and
the Masses: Prior to independence, the masses
are united with the leadership on the question of
independence. But after the independence, when
practical problems confront the new states, there
is the necessity of established channels, organs
of public opinion or interest groups that can
transmit demands and grievances. There is a.con
siderable gulf socially and intellectually between
the modernizing urban elite from which the leaders
spring and the illiterate peasant masses and
migrants to the city. These two groups are hardly
able to conununicate with each other and often lack
appreciation of the crucial �portance of communica
tion.

4.

Problems of Lagging Interest Articulation: Due to
the lack of organization, the different groups in
the developing countries very of ten spur revolution
which disturbs the stability and effectiveness of
the government. The operation of political parties
may resemble a conspirational net of clandestine
groups or a social mass movement and lack many of
the attributes typical of a more advanced stage.

5.

Psychological Problems: The, traditional outlook and
way of life also stand in the way of change and
development.12

These, in general, are the problems of political development.

Methodology

There are various approaches to the study of political development
such. as historical survey, structural-functional system analysis, elite
theory, group theory, games, conununications, etc.

.
12
Peter H. Merkl, Political Continuity and Change (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 359-360.
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But political development is a very elusive concept.
all phases of life.

It includes

It is not a·promiseJto study all phases of life

related to political development by a single approach.
The politics of the developing areas are in the transitional
stage.

They are neither modern nor traditional.

traditional and modern elements.

They are midway between

In most developing soci�ties,the formal

structures of government were arbitrarily introduced from abroad during
the colonial period and became autonomous forces within the society.
There is lack of well-institutionalized social and economic interest
groups in many developing societies which also brings into question the
roles of different classes of individuals.
diffused.

The institutions are very much

As such it is not possible to distinguish between different

institutions on the basis of roles.

The lack of institutionalized groups

creates a ban on the free interplay between demands, supports, and deci
sions which is emph&sized by David Easton.
The elite character is

also changing very fast.

of elite came in the political scene of Bangladesh.
circumstances lead to different kinds of elites.

Different kinds

Moreover, different

In order to understand

problems of political development we have to understand the different cir
cumstances that led to the coming up of different kinds of leaders.
There is also the need for new kinds of data.
society it is possible to accumulate data.

In the developed

Government agencies, the mass

media, popular authors and private industry employ many of the categories
the political scientists utilizes and thus gathers information that is
useful for study.

"But in the developing countries, there is usually

little in the way of acceptable data available on even the most conven-

16

tional matters, and frequently nothing at all has been collected on subjects of interest for the innovative researcher."

13

There is a lack of consensus among the people on the fundamental
question of life.

There exists ambivalence in the public mind.

For the

researcher these features of developing political systems call for a greater
than ordinary problem of the relationships between individual experience
and collective action.
extremely complex.

The task of measuring strength of opinion becomes

Also, in such systems there is a greater need for con-

cern with �.questions about the motivation of actors and what it is that
compels them to take the positions they do from time to time.
In order to appreciate fully the human problems which can arise
from profound cultural change, it is necessary to place the problems of
individual psychology within the broader contact of social history.
Research based upon intensive interviewing and the analysis of life
histories is necessary in order to identify and characterize different
patterns of individual reaction.
A common hallmark of all developing systems is the gulf between
the ruling few and the mass of the population.

In these··kind ·of bifurcated

societies there is often a profound problem of communication between the
mass and the elite.

As such, it is difficult for the communication theory

to study the problem of the developing countries.

This problem of the gap

between the elite and the mass offers a wide range of challenging research
possibilities.

One of the most important indicators of the probable pat-

tern of national development is to be found in the particular manner in

13
Lucian W. Pye, "The Developing Areas: Problems for Research,''
Robert E. Ward (ed.), Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1964), p. 24.
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which mediation between elite and mass is being strengthened.

This funda-

mental problem of the gap between rulers and citizens suggests the great
importance of more research into the dynamics of pol·itical parties and
the problems of building voluntary associations.
The elites in the developing societies comprise an extraordinarily
small group of men.

The fact that the leaders belong to an intimate and

restricted world places many serious limits on the possibilities of politics.

The existence of a closed polity.:·-..fueans. that personality becomes

a desirable factor in determining the course of political energy.

This

characteristic of develpping political systems can pose some extremely
difficult problems for the researcher.

Instead of dealing with formal

issues and matters of political doctrine the analyst must turn his attention to the political style of actors and the spirit which they conduct
their relations with each other.

We are to take into account the dis-

proportionate influence that the personality of a single leader may have
on national political life.

In most developing societies, especially in

Bangladesh, there is much room for general studies of the social and eco'

nomic groups which are politically important or which appear politically
significant.

For many years there has been a need for more systematic

studies of such groups as students, intellectuals, journalists, business
communities, labor unions and even the more formally established organizations such as the army or the civil service.
are recruited.

We are t.a . .-know ..how. leaders

Has there been any change over time in the importance and

the proper position of the different groups?
Such problems force the political scientists to engage in intensive
sociological and economic analysis.

In order to discuss the pro�pects of
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different potential leadership elements it is necessary to understand
the prospects of fundamental economic and sociological change.
Due to these problems; the analytic descriptive method will be
useful for understanding the problems of political development in Bangla
desh which have the similar characteristics of the developing countries
of the world .

The analytic descriptive method will try to take into

account historical survey, the nature of the elite, group dynamics , socio
economic changes.and all other factions of the society .

Statement of Hypotheses
First, Bangladesh is like the other developing countries of the
world striving for political development.

The leaders and the people a�e

eager to achieve political development as fast as possible.

After the

birth of Bangladesh every political scientist and leader of Bangladesh
thought there would be no more problems of integration as it existed in
Pakistan until 1 97 1 .

But still the problem o f integration is not solved.

Bangladesh is still suffering from the problems of integration, hindering
political development .
Second , like the other countries of Asia and Africa, Bangladesh
is faced with the' problem of stability.
there has been many ups and downs .
ment .

Within the span of a few years

There is no orderly change of govern

The government took different forms within these few·years.

There

is no unity among the people and leaders on the form of government .
Third , the lack of well-organized party-backing effective mobili
zation poses a problem of political development in Bangladesh .

Bangladesh
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is characterized by many political parties.

But no political party is

effective enough to mobilize people under one national ideology.

This

lack of a well-organized party creates confusion among the people
causing a threat to stability and orderly change.
Fourth, the proper balance of the bureaucracy is an important
problem of political development in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is facing the

dilemma with regard to the effective balance of the bureaucracy.

On the

one hand, if bureaucracy is given too much power, it hinders the growth
of political institutions.

On the other hand, if the bureaucracy is not

given much power, their non-cooperation hinders administration and the
effective execution of politics.
Fifth, the most precarious problem which seriously hinders poli
tical development in Bangladesh is the problem of economic development.
Failure in the solution of economic problems of the people leads to
frustration leading to instability and ineffectiveness of the government.

CHAPTER I I
THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRATION
The central problem in the developing countries is to achieve
integration.

Integration is the first requisite of political development .

Without polit ical integration the goal o f political development cannot be
achieved.
Myron Weiner has given several meanings to integration.

" I t means

national integration, i. e . , to bring together culturally and socially dis·crete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a
nat ional identity. 111
The term integration covers a vast range of human relationships
and attitudes--the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties
and the develop ment of a sense of nationality; the integration of political
units int o a common territorial framework with

P

government which can exer-

cise authority; the integrat ion o f the cit izen into a common polit ical
process; and finally, the integrat ion of individuals into organizations
for purposive activities .
united by a common thread .

As diverse as these definitions are they are
These are all attempts t o define what it is

which holds a society and a political system t o gether.

1
Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development"
Welch
(ed . ) Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political
in
Change (London: Wadsworth Publishing Co. , 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 130- 1 3 1 .
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Bangladesh came into existence as a result of the failure of
national integration after its establishment .

The political scientists

believed that there would be no problem of integration in Bangladesh
because it had homogeneous population, geographic unity, and a common
language.

These are very important elements to form a nation, but i f

we take into account Myron Weiner ' s definition of national integration,
we find Bangladesh still has problems with integration.
Bangladesh has a homogeneous people.

"The Muslims constituted

80. 4 percent of the population; the Hindus 18.4 percent .

cent of the people speak Bengali . 11

2

Almost 98 per

The Hindus are the dominant minority.

Because of a long history of Hindu-Mus lim animosity the Hindus are still
looked upon with suspicion by the Muslims .
The main threat to territorial and nat ional integration came from
the other national minorities in Bangladesh.
500,000.

lie.

"Their total number reaches

They are settled primarily in the outlying regions of ·the repub-

In the southeast (the Chittagong Hill Tracts) live several small

national groups of Assamese-Burmese descent; the Chak.mas (in the Karmaf ully River valley and to the north o f it); the Marmas, who are sometimes
also called the Maghs (to the south o f the Karmafully River) ; the Tipperas or Tipuras, the Morongs or Murungs ; the Tanchaungs; Karri s ; Ryangs;
lushies or Mizos, etc . "

3

2
Nyrop, An Economic Geography of Bangladesh.

3
Lori V. Giankovsky, "The Social Structure of Society in the
People:s Republic of Bangladesh, " Asian Survey, March 1974.
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The largest of the Assamese-Burmese pe ople of the Chittagong
Hill Tracts are the Chakmas, who inhabit the Ramgamati Distri c t .

"They

number, according to the estimate at the end of 197 1 , - about 250, 000
people.

They are Buddhist s .

The Chakmas rebelled many times against

the authority of the English colonizers, and until 1947 perceived a cons�derable amo unt of autonomy under the domination of the hereditary Rajah
(king) of the Roy dynasty.

The leaders of the several Chakma clans came

out in 1947 against including the Rangamati District as a part o f Pakistan and were suppressed by the East Pakistan autho rities, some o f whom
later emigrated to India . 1 1

4

The infiltrations into the Chittagong Hill

Tracts by tradesmen and entrepreneur-outsiders caused the politically
active leaders of the Chakmas to t ry to achieve administrative autonomy
for the region which they inhabited.

This movement received support

attested to by the victory of its leaders who stood as independents at
the general elections in December, 1 9 7 0 .

I n the summer of 1972 the

leaders of the Chakmas sent a memorandum to the Bangladesh government ,
pointing out the need to concede administrative autonomy to the Chittagong
'

Hill Tract and to form a special legislative body there.
Bangladesh was created out of the regional dispar ity prevailing
between East and West Pakistan.

As such it has to pay special attention

to the regional distribution because regionalism which started in the
·Pakistani period may distrub Bangladesh also.

But as far as development

is concerned, we can find some inter-regional differences within Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is divided into four regions :

4

Ibid . , p . 7 0 1 .

north, south, center and
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eas t .

The popularly-held view i n Bangladesh generally casts the north

and south as underdeveloped ; and indeed certain disparities between the
north and south and the center and east can be discerned.

''The center-

east has most of the big urban center s , the capital Dacca, the major port
town Chittagong, and the maj or industrial center Narayangong, all lie in
this region .

The center-east has more people in non-agricultural labor

(center 1 8 . 1 %; east 1 3 . 8%, north 1 1 . 1 % , south 1 6 . 5%) and a higher l iter
acy rate (center 1 6 . 3%, east 1 9 . 3 % , north 1 6 . 7%, south 1 7. 7%). 11

5

The center-east is more modern ; it also comprises most of the
crowded districts and contains nearly half the province's popula t ion .
There is more migration out of this region to the less crowded north and
south.

This int ernal migrat ion creates some resentment of migrants in

the north and south.
The north and south have developed more slowly.
ment in these areas against the c entral governmen t .
j ut e-producing areas.

There is resent-

These a r e the large

They are d emanding a greater share in the distribu-

t ion of wealth and are citing the exampl e o f the then East Pakistan, which
'

was used to earn maximum of foreign exchange.

Of course, the present

government is trying to concentrate more in the north and south.

The

opening of TV stations in Natore ( in the north) and Khulna (south) was
directed to this end .
The creation o f nat ional ideology helps to solve the problem of
national integration.

It serves as a unifying force among the various

s egments o f the population .

York:

Lack of an ideology to inspire the hetero-

5
Rounaq Johan , Pakistan : Failure in National Integration (New
Columbia University Press, 1 971 ) , p . 5 .
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geneous population to indulge in various activities detrimental to
national integration.
In order to unite the nations Bangladesh needed a national
ideology.

The six-point program which united the people of Bangladesh

lost its significance after the creation of Bangladesh.

That i s why

Sheikh Muj ibar Rahman tried to unite the people of Bangladesh under the
ideology of Mujibism, i. e . , nationalism, democracy, secularism and socialism.

Mehden remarks that in order to be successful the ideology ought to

be general enough in scope and wording so as to unite a large part of the
population.
allegianc e . "

"Doctrines that are too explicit may be difficult to win mass
6

A second element usually found in successful ideological programs
i s the combination of ideology with organization.

An ideological cam

paign may fail i f it i s not accompanied by some long-term benefits.

The

failure o f many new independent countries to attain the goals expected of
independence has been one of the factors responsible for the high rate of
military coups in the developing world.
If we try to analyze Muj ibism on the basis of criterias given by
Mehden, Mujibism is too general , without any substantive basis.

Though it

tried to embrace different ideologies such as democracy, socialism, secular
ism and nationalism, it could not specifically mention
of the four principles of Muj ibism.

the characteristics

It could not satisfy any group .

None

o f the principles were satisfied fully.
The supporters of democracy criticized Mujib ism because it gave
excessive power to the Prime Minister giving h im a chance of turning into

6 von der Mehden, Politics in the Developing Nations.
·
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a dictator.

They also criticized the emergency provisions of the con-

stitution which incorporated Mujibism.

The emergency provisions will

lead to a "perpetual emergency . 1 1 7
The socialistic provision failed to satisfy the socialists who
thought that making socialism a part of the directive principles of st�te
without making that principle enforceable in a court of law, would not
lead to the establishment of socialism in Bangladesh.

One Bengali intel-

lectual referred to the constitution 11as a fundamental measure against
socialism, democracy , nationalism and secularism. 11

8

The concept of secularism created much frustration among the people,
80. 9 percent of whom are Muslims.

The Muslims thought of secularism as no

religion and more satisfying to the Hindus .

They also thought secularism

was an Indian ploy to have more dominance in Bangladesh.
As far as the second condition was concerned , though the Awami
League had a well-organized base in the local levels , it could not combine
the organization with ideology.
zation .

Opposition was created within the organi-

The main force of the Awami League , the Student League , was
,

divided on the issue of Mujibism.

The Rab-Siraj faction of the Student

League severely criticized Mujibism and insisted on scientific socialism.
Moreover, this kind of ideology could not give any long range benefits to the people.

The main reason which influenced the Bangladeshi peo-

ple to get separation is that they were expecting a better life without

7

Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1974:
Political Polarization,11 Asian Survey, Feb. 1975.
8

rbid.

Economic Crisis and
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Pakistan because in Pakistani period

East Pakistan presently Bangladesh

used to earn the maximum o f foreign exchange.

When Bangladesh became

independen t , the people were �xpecting a happy and contented life.

But

on the contrary, they found the non-availability of essential goods, the
ev er-rising price index, the unequal sharing of austerit y , the corruption
and nepotism of the Awami League l eaders, and Indian influences in Bangladesh.

Muj ibism, as an ideology , failed to satisfy the long-felt needs of

the people.

As such, it could not hold the population together .

Some observers in Bangladesh took it for granted that the country
would not have any difficulty in the task of identity building , but subs equent events proved otherwise.

The separation from Pakistan did not

mak e it eas ier for the Bangladeshis to det ermine their ident ity and the
s earch for identity in Bangladesh began soon after its s eparat ion from
Pakistan.

The Indian army, to whom the Pakistani soldiers surrendered ,

did not end ear itself for long.

Within a few weeks of the fall of Dacca,

there were sporadic reports of clashes between Bengali soldiers of the
Mukti Bahini and the Indian army .

When Muj ib assumed office, after being
•

released from a Pakistani jail , h e recognized the growing s entiment against
Indian soldiers in Bangladesh and persuaded Prime Minister Indira Ghandi
to withdraw them.
Even after the withdrawal of Indian troops, the strong influence of
the Indian government persisted in Bangladesh.

The numerous government

officials, teachers , studen t s , politicians and prominent individuals who
had spent months in India during the 1 97 1 liberation struggle were inclined
to accept Indian influence in Banglad esh.

They d id not hesitate to raise

the bogey of Pakistani collaboration against those who did not agree with
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them.
India. 11

For a while, "patriotism seemed to be linked with pilgrimage to
9

The public reaction was very quick.

One Dacca newspaper wrote

in disgust that Bangladesh was a nation of 65 million - collaborators .
returnees from India were sarcast ically called 1 1Haj is1 1

10

The

by the critics

of the Awami League governmen t .
As events developed, Bangladesh sought its identity through an
opposition to Indian influence and pr edominance.

Following the Indian

model, Bangladesh became a s ecular state and all political parties with
Islamic leanings were banned from the day the Awami League l eaders assumed
office in Dacca.

To the critics, this ban was an Indian ploy to retain its

influence in Bangladesh.

But while officially Bangladesh r emained a secu-

lar state, the Islamic identity was continuously stressed to or by the
public .

Bengali Muslims had not been serious in stressing a Muslim ident-

ity in Pakistan politics, but they seemed more anxious to do so in secular
Banglad esh.

Islamic identity became the center of r esistance against Indian

predominance in Bangladesh politics.

In the summer of 1973, the so-called

Muslim Bengali Movement was started by the right wing Islamic forces to
'

revive Muslim sentiment and to resist the secularism propounded by the
ruling Awami League.
The pro-Islamic forces began to rally around the octogefian leader ,
Maulana Bhasani, who professed socialism but believed in Islamic principles.
He began advocating Islamic socialism.

Within a few months of Bangladesh ' s

independence, the Maulana began open and bitter criticism o f Indian influ-

9Rashiduzzaman , "Changing Political Pat terns in Banglad esh:
Int ernal Constraints and Ext ernal Fear s , " Asian Survey, Sept . , 1 97 7 .
lO
Haj is--pilgrims from Mecca.
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ence in Bangladesh.

11He also criticized the Awami League ' s policy of

secularism and gave tacit support to the "Muslim Bengali" movement by
saying that within six months time there would be a new flag in Bangladesh--a euphemistic reference to the flag of Muslim Bengal . "

11

However ,

the movement largely dissipated when several of its prominant leaders were
arrested for clandestine activities.

Although the Maoists did not openly

admit i t , there was a covert understanding between them and the right wing
Islamists.

There were numerous reports that the extreme left and moderate

forces had struck an alliance on the basis of anti-Indian sentiment and
opposition to the principle o f Muj ibism, i . e . , nationalism, socialism,
secularism and democracy.

12

Anti-Indian feelings and sympathy for Bangladesh ' s identity as a
Muslim nation became so strong that even Muj ib began to modify his policy.
To the surprise of the Indian government and even his close political associates, he accepted an invitation to attend the Islamic conference held in
Pakistan in the spring of 1974.

The Islamic Summit proved to be a net

diplomatic gain for Muj ib because Pakistan used it to legitimize the decision to recognize Bangladesh.

It also opened the door for Bangladesh to

enter the United Nations and contact the Middle Eastern countries, which
offered aid to new nations.

Later in 1 9 7 4 , Muj ib visited Egyp t , Kuwait

and other Muslim nations to promote understanding with those countrie s .
The Awami League also granted clemency to the so-called Pakistani collaborators and sought an understanding with the Islamic forces.

By this time,

l l Rashiduzzaman, .£P.· c i t .
12

Bengali nationalism, popular idea of democracy, secularism based
no discrimination against the Hindus or other minorities.
Socialism, based
on nationalization. All these ideas correspond to the ideas of Mrs. Indira
Ghandi , the ex-Prime Minister of India.
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there were numerous reports that the rightists were regrouping .

At this

stage, the Awami League government became concerned and arrested some
old clemency.

An official spokesman explained that some of these leaders

were planning to set up a political party opposed to the principles of
secularism.
Although Sheikh Mujibar Rahman formally concentrated all power in
his hands and made Bangladesh a one-party dictatorship early in 1 9 7 5 , his
secret preparations reportedly started much earlier.

The para-military

forces called the Rakkhi Bahini were widely used to suppres.s dissent.

Hard-

pressed by serious economic problems and challenges from the right as well
as the left, the Awami League apparently sought a fresh identity for Bangladesh through the one-man dictatorship of a charismatic leader, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman.

A brutal challenge to this endeavor came through the bloody

coup of August 1 5 , 1 9 7 5 .

Innne diately after the coup, the young military

rebels went on the radio and announced that Bangladesh was an Islamic state.
The new president, Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, who took over from the leaders
of the coup , later rescinded that announcement , evidently under Indian
'

government pressure.

But the question of Islamic identity remained alive

and in April 1 9 7 7 , when General Ziaur Rahman became president , the constitution was amended to drop secularism and incorporate some Islamic principles.
The martial law administration had earlier made several gestures
to the growing Muslim sentiment in Bangladesh.

Soon after the August coup,

ambassadors between Pakistan and Bangladesh were exchanged and communications re-establishe d .

The Collaborators Act, 1 9 7 2 , was repealed, which

gave some legitimacy to those Muslim leaders who were alleged to have been
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supportive of Pakistan in 19 7 1 .

Several senior civil servants who were

known to be sympathetic to I s lamic views , were reinstated in important
positions.

After being outlawed for about four years_, the religious

parties were a llowed

a

formal existence in 1 9 7 6 .

were exchanged with Muslim countries.

Official delegations

High officials began to partici

pate and encourage Muslim religious festivals.

Air Vice Marshall Tawab , .

one of the military strong men, openly encouraged right wing forces and
supported an Islamic ideology for Bangladesh.

Ziaur Rahman visited Saudi

Arabia and attended the Islamic Conference in Istanbul in 1976 .

Intern

ally, all these moves were also intended to mobilize the support of th e
Muslim forces who had opposed Muj ib and his secularist policy.
There are several other questions relevant to the identity of
Bangladesh.
nation?

After Sheikh Mujibar Rahman who will be the f.ather of the

Will the present national anthem be retained?

Is Rabindra

Nath Tagore of Nazral Islam the national poet of Bangladesh?
assassination of

Since the

Muj ib, his name has not been officially mentioned as

the father of the nation except for the brief interval o f Khalid Mushar
raf ' s counter coup in November 1975 when : Muj ib was reinstated as the
father of the nation.

There were suggestions to acknowledge Maulana

Bhasani, who received a state funeral when he died after a prolonged
illness in 1 9 7 6 , as the father of Bangladesh.

But according to informed

sources the military government does not intend to have any officially
recognized father.
Bangladesh.

There is also a question about the national anthem in

The conservative Muslims never accepted Tagore ' s song as the

national anthem while the pro-Peking radicals thought of it as a subtle
means of expanding Indian influence in Bangladesh.

It will be no sur-
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prise if the national anthem for Bangladesh is changed under assertive
pressure from the right as well as the left.

There is an inspiring cam-

paign in Dacca to develop Nazral Islam as the nat ional poet and adopt
one o f his songs as the nat ional anthem.
the problem of identity.

All these problems clearly show

The present government is emphasiz ing Islamic

principles, nationalism and sovereignty which are not clearly in agreement on fundamentals.
The integration of values, as Welch remarks, it encompasses at

a

minimum means that . there are acceptable proc edures for the resolution of
conflic t .

All societ ies have conflicts and all societ ies have procedures

for the settlement of conflict are not always satisfactory .

There are

soc ieties where the r ight of tradit ional authority to resolve conflict
remained intact during the early phases of modernization.
There is the need for the integration of values because the scale
and volume of conflict increases in societies experiencing modernization.
The status of social groups is f r equently chang ed , even reversed, as education opens new occupat ional opportunities as the suffrage
'

increases

the potential importance of numbers and as industrial expansion provides
new opportunities for employment and wealth.

A caste or tribe once low in

status and wealth may now rise or at least see the opportunity formobility
and social groups once high in status, power and wealth may f eel threatened .
Traditional rivalries are aggravated and new conflicts are created as social
relationships change.
The modernization process also creates new occupat ional roles and
these new roles often conflict with the old .

The new local government

officer may be opposed by the tribal and caste leader s .
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Welch suggests "there are two model strategies for integrating
values in the developing society.

One stresses the importance of con-

sensus and is concerned with maximizing uniformity.

The second method

is the way integrative values may be maximized emphasizes the interplay
of individual and group interests . "

13

A modern political system has no single mechanism, no single procedure, no single institution for the resolution of conflict; indeed , it
is precisely the multiplicity of individua l s , institutions and procedures
for dispute settlement that characterizes the modern political system,
both democratic and totalitarian.

In contra s t , developing societies , . with

an increasing range of internal confl ic t , typically lacks such individua l s ,
institutions and procedures.

It is as if mankind ' s capacity to generate

conflict is greater than his capacity to find methods for resolving conflict; the lag is clearly greatest in societies in which fundamental economic and social relationships are rapidly changing.
Integration of values has become a predominant problem in Bangladesh because it i s endowed with so many ideologies and so many values .
There is not yet any consensus on the question of the fundamentals of the
state.
The constitution was passed on November 4, 1 9 7 2 , but it was severely
criticized by the opposition parties, especially from pro-Peking leftist
groups such as the National Awami Party-Bhasani , the communist party of
Bangladesh, the Revolutionary Students Union and the Bangla-Students Union.
They severely attacked the draft constitution and even challenged the right

1

3welch,

.££.· c i t .
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of the Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution.

According to

Maulana Bhasani "the Constituent Assembly was elected under the 1970
Legal Framework Order (LFO) of General Yahya Khan to frame the consti.
tution of Pakistan .
Awami League.

I t got i�s mandate in the 6-point program �f- the

But it got no legal claim to frame the constitution of a

sovereign Bangladesh.

14

They demanded that the constitution be framed

by a national convention comprised of the representatives of all the
political parties and mass-organizations which had participated in the
liberation struggle and should be adopted by a referendum.
According to this group the draft constitution was neither socialist nor even democratic.

Though some good words about socialism had been

incorporated in the fundamental principles of state policy there was no
guarantee o f food, clothing, shelter, education, medical care and employment for the citizens.

There was no provision for confiscation of foreign

capital and abolition of feudalism.

Usual democratic human rights were

denied by providing for so many restrictions to be imposed by law in the
name of security, public order, morality and so on.
"The National Social Party, led by A. S . M. Abdur Rab and Maj or
M. A . Ja1i l , remarked that the constitution was worthless .
reflect the hopes and aspirations o f the people.

I t did not

It did not recognize

the class conflict nor was there any provision for removing economic
inequality and exploitation,

Accordingly, the realization of socialism

was not possible through this constitution . 11

15

14Abul Fazal Hoq , "Constitution Making in Bangladesh , " Pacific
Affairs, Spring 1973.
15
Talukdar Maniruzzaman, ..2..P_· cit .
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The National Awami Party and the Communist Party of Bangladesh
hailed the draft constitution for its provision for parliamentary government and secularism and inclusion of fundamental right·s but contended that
fundamental rights had been infringed by imposing certain restrictions on
them.

According to the party, adequate provisions had not been made for

the establishment of socialism which was one of the accepted fundamental
principles of state policy.
basic necessities of life.

There was no constitutional guarantee of
The Prime Minister had been given too much

power and , as a result, the smooth progress of parliamentary democracy
might be handicapped.
The existing government liaB. been transferred to ..the: �·presi'd1!n.tia:l form
.

of government.
to Ziaur Rahman.

Accordingly, the election held gave a landslide victory
He announced for sovereign parliamentary election.

S t i l l , a majority of the people are unconcerned.

The radical parties

did not participate in the election.
Bangladesh faces the problem of elite-mass integration.

As Welch

remarks, since fundamental cultural and attitudinal gaps exist between the
.

elite and the mass--the forme·r being secular minde d ,

English

and Western

educated while the latter remain oriented toward traditional values and are
fundamentally religious, and vernacular speaking.

The elite mass gap also

implies that communication is inadequate , that i s , the elite are oriented
toward persuading the mass to change their orientation but the feedback
of political demands is not heard or not responded t o .
I n a l l political systems, those of developing a s well as developed
societies, there are differences in outlook between those who govern and
those who are governed.

In a developed system, those who govern are
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accessible to influence by those who are governed--even in a totalitar
ian system and those who are governed
zation by the government.

are readily available for mobili

In modern societies governments are so engaged

in effecting the economy, social welfare and defense that there must be
a closer interaction between government and the governed .

Government must

mobilize individuals to save, invest , pay taxes, serve in the army, and
obey laws.

Modern government

must also know what the public will toler

ate and must be able to anticipate , before the policies are pursued , what
the public reaction to a given policy might be.

Moreover, the modern

government is increasingly armed with sophisticated tools of economic
analysis and public opinion surveys to increase its capacity to predict
both the economic and political consequences o f its actions.
But in the new nations there is no such developed mechanism for
surveying public opinion.

Moreover, what they often hear is always inapro

priate.
If we analyze the elite structure of Bangladesh, we will see many
differences exist between the leaders and the masses .

Before 197 1 , when

East Bengali was part o f Pakistan absolute state authority was concentrated
in the hands of a narrow upper stratum of well-to-do classes.

This stratem

consisted of the numerically insignificant monopolistic upper crust of the
industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the upper layers of the landowners
and the civil and military bureaucracy.

In the ethnic respect the elite

strata which ruled Pakistan was non-homogeneous and was dominated by those
of Western and Norhtern Indian extraction or representatives of West Paki
stan.

The formation of the People ' s Republic of Bangladesh deprived this

elite layer of the ruling position which they had occupied in the former
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Eastern Province of Pakistan.

The leaders of the East Bengali National

Movement and the social forces which they represented came into power in
the young independent state.
A process of cosolidating the new elite is taking place in Bangla
desh.

Joining its ranks are especially the representatives of the East

Bengali nationalist bourgeoisie, the landowners, intelligentsia leaders
and Bengalis,

who up until 1 9 7 1 had occupied posts in the prominent civil,

j udicial and police services in East Pakistan, i . e . , actually those who
were by birth from these social strata of society.
But the elites have hardly any touch with the general public who
live in the rural areas.

The elites have little contact except on occa

sions generally before the elections.

There are no organized groups for

the peasants to mobilize the people so that their interests are not aggre
gated by the political system.
These problems of integration need to be solved .
cess is needed for solving these problems.

But a long pro

People should be integrated

to national ideology and national goals which are basic requirements for
development .

CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND ffi�ITY
Like many underdeveloped countries the most precarious problems
which Bangladesh is facing is the lack of unity and stability.
one of the fundamental problems of political developmen t .

This is

Peter H . Merkyl

in his book, Political Continuity and Social Change, has identified the
problem
ment.

of unity and stability as one o f the problems of political develop-

1

These problems o f stability and unity are present in many developing countries.

For example , in Indonesia, Javanese imperialism has led to

four major insurrections in the Molucussor and Ambiona on two occasions in
1950-51 and 1954-55, in Sumatra in 1 956-57 and a complex series o f revolts
in Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes in 1958-66.

2

Before analyzing instability in Bangladesh, we must be clear on the
•

definition of instability.

Claude Ake in his article, "Modernization and

Political Instability--A Theoretical Exploration," conceptualizes political
instability implicitly or explicitly as violence , conflict, civi� disobedi-

1

Peter H . Merky l , Political Continuity and Social Change (New York:
, John Wiley Bros . , 1967) .
2Michael Breeher, "Political Instability in the New States of Asia , 11
in Eckstein and Apter (eds . ) Corporate Politics (New York: The Free Press ,
1963) ' p. 1 8 .
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ence, disorder, short duration of government , lack of institutionalization and so forth.

3

Feieband used aggressi,on of groups within the· political system
as an indic ator of poli tica l instabili ty. 4

Jean Bhandel defines poli tica l

instability as lack of longevity of government.

For Hartin Needler, "a

country is stable i f the government is chosen by free elections and i f
the government acts constitutionally . 11

5

We shall analyze instability in Bangladesh in the sense of political disorder, armed revo l t s , and short duration of the government.
Soon after the creation of Bangladesh, infighting threatened the
stability of the country.

There was infighting between the various sec-

tors of the Mukti-Bahini (the liberation forces) .
Though the constitution was drafted within six months and became
effective on December 1 6 , 1 9 7 2 , it faced bitter opposition from the opposition party though not in the Assembly which was dominated by the Awami
League.

"The constitution was criticized as creating a type of dictator-

ship by the Prime Minister and the emergency provision as perpetual emergency.

The constitution failed to inspire the vast majority of the youth

who liked to see more radical provisions included . "

6

There were armed attacks on local law and order enforcing agencies.
"Between June and November there were armed attacks on 52 thanas (admini-

3claude Ake, "Modernization and Political Instability , " World Poli
tic s , July 1 9 7 4 , p. 802.
4

Ibid . , p . 807.

5Ibid.
6

Rounaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1 9 7 3 :
Asian Survey, Feb . , 1 9 7 7 � p . 1 9 9 .

Nation Building in a New State , "
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strative unit composed of some villages) and police stations . 1 1
were secret killings and kidnapping s .
within the Awami League.

7

There

There was growing antagonism

I t s �ront organization,

the - S tudent League,

was divided on the quest ion of introduction of the scientific socialism
and mixed economy.

One faction,

led by A .

S . M . Abdur Rab,

demanded

scientific socialism and the other faction advocated Muj ibism,
socialism,

democracy,

secularism and nationalism.

started in the top Awami Leaguers .

On January 2 5 ,

i.e. ,

Factionalism also
1 9 7 5 , at the initia-

tive o� Sheikh Muj ib and against the private sentiments of the majority
of the members of Parliament , the constitution was amended to provide for
a presidential form o f government .

The president was authorized t o form

one national party and to suspend the activities of all political groups
that refused to join the new political party.

The amendment further pro-

vided that Sheikh Mujib would be the president of the country for five
years from the date o f the constitut ional amendmen t .
June 6.

The constitution o f the National Party called the Bangladesh

Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL) .
bers of the Awami League.
(NAP) .

Mujib announced on

It was comprised mainly of the mem'

From the opposition,

the National Awami Party

the Moscow faction and the pro-Moscow Communist Party welcomed it .

It was fol lowed by other authoritarian measures.
brought under government managemen t .
June 21,

All newspapers were

Through a presidential ord inance on

61 districts were created by breaking up the existing 19 distric t s .

O n July 16, MuJ ib announced the names o f 61 governors who were t o take district administration on September 1 ,

7rbid . , p .

200.

1975.

The governors designated were
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given special training starting July 2 1 , which was to cont inue until
August 1 6 ,

1975.

There was also the plan to place ha�f a battalion o f

the Jatiyo Rakki Bahini (the N?tional Defense Force) under each governor .
The governor would be under direct control of Sheikh Mujib.

The Jatiyo

Rakki Bahini units would be increased annually so that by the end of 1980
the total st rength would be 1 3 0 , 000, one regiment under each governo r .
"The new system o f copying the Soviet method but rejecting the ideology
was designed to suppress every vestige of opposition and perpetuate the
corrupt rule o f the Sheikh Mujib tribe in the softest state in the world. 1 1

8

Due to this change o f government and growing frustrat ions among
the public for the constant failure o f Mujib to solve problems triggered
the army coup of August 1 6 ,

1 9 7 5 , which killed Sheikh Mu jib and his family.

The army brought Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed , ex-Foreign Trade Minister , as
the president of Bangladesh.
of Staff of the Army .

He replaced General Ziaur Rahman as the Chief

On November 3 , several senior officers led by Briga-

<lier Khaled Musharraf staged a second coup.

The leaders o f the November 3

coup negotiated with President Mushtaque and allowed a safe passage to
'

Bangladesh for the 1 5 military o f f icers who were widely known to be connected with the August 1 5 coup.

The leaders of the November 3 coup lost

heart when the news spread in the evening o f November 4 that four leaders
of the BKSAL , Tajuddin Ahmed, ex-Finance Minister; Syed Nazral Islam,
Industries Minister; Monsoor Ali,

ex-

ex-Prime Minister; and Qamruzzaman, ex-

Commerce Minister, were found dead in the Dacca central j a i l .

On November

5 , Khaled Musharraf and his associates forced Mushtaque to hand over the
presidency to the Chief Justice o f the Supreme Cour t , A . S . M.

8

talukdar Maniruzzaman, " Bangladesh in 1 9 7 4 :

Political Polarization, " Asian Survey,

Feb.

1975 .

Sayem.

Economic Crisis and
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On November 6 ,
commissioned soldiers)
Musharraf.

the Jawan�

(soldiers) and the Sepoys (non

staged another revolution which killed Khaled

Zia was able to re�tore discipline within ·the army, but he

faced opposition from the disgruntled Awami Leaguers, many o f whom left
India ' s Jatiyo Samaj tantrik: Dal (the National Socialist Party) which
believed in the establishment o f scientific socialism.

In February 1 9 7 6 ,

some sepoys in Chittigong rebelled , but i t was suppressed .
General Zia became pnesi'dent when Justice Sayem resigned in early
1977 .

On May 30,

in Ziaur Rahman.

1 9 7 7 there was a nation-wide referendum on confidence
He received 99 percent pf yes votes.

endum two months followed without any kind o f violence .

After the refer
On August

15,

1 9 7 7 , there were reports o f clashes betwe�n the Awami League workers and
the army when the Awami League tried to mourn the day for Sheikh Muzib .
There were also reports of sporadic violence in the count ryside.
Zia once again faced threats to his posit ion and stability of the
economy when an abortive coup on September 30 and October 2 killed 1 1 Air
Force o f f icers and 10 soldiers.

The coup start�d in Bogr:a on September 30

and the rebels then struck Dacca on October 2 when Japanese terrorists
hijacked a JAL plane to Dacca airport from where they bargained for the
release o f their jailed compatriots in Japan and a six million dollar
ransom.
Almost the entire Bangladesh administration , including top Air
Force officials, were negotiating with the terrorists at Dacca airport.
It provided an ideal opportunity for the disgruntled elements within the
armed forces to stage a revolution which was quickly suppressed.
casualties on both sides exceeded 230.

" Total

About 500 people were tried for
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alleged complicity and 92 persons received the death sentence for inciting rebellion. "

9

Although the abortive �oup was quickly suppressed ,
the morale o f the military administration .

it has shaken

Zia is under pressure from

his colleagues who fear that such coup attempts might become a periodic
feature in Bangladesh threatening the stability of the country unless
drastic steps are taken to depolit ��ize the soldiers.

This explains why

the military tribunals went into action immediately after the coup.
" The influx of Muslims, numbering about 140 , 000 from the Arakan
area o f Burma,

created further problems o f stability in Bangladesh.

They

have been evicted by the Burmese government and they have rushed into the
.

neighboring Muslim country of Bangladesh. "

10

However ,

the problem has

been settled by the bilateral initiatives o f Bangladesh and Burmese governments.
All these show the prevailing instability in Bangladesh.
try to find out the causes of instability.
macy:

First ,

the government body needs legitimacy.

We shall

the problem o f legiti-

I t is the main reason for

the short duration of government in the underdeveloped countries.
According to Lucian Pye,

"

A legitimacy crisis is a breakdown in

the con s titutional structure and performance o f government that arises out
of differences over the proper nature of authority for the system.

A legiti-

macy crisis can thus take the form o f a change in the fundamental structure
or character of a government , a change in the source from which it claims

9 1bid . '

p.

215.

lO
The Bangladesh Observer, May 1 1 ,

1978 .
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t o derive i t s ultimate authority o r a change i n the ideals i t professes
to represent.

Basic to a legitimacy crisis is a change in the way in

which governmental authority i� conceived or itself act s . 11

11

Lucian Pye has identified four principle causes o r sources of
12
.
.
1 egi. timacy
crises
.
i n t he d eve 1opmen t process .

First ,

there i s the

breakdown of governmental institutions that occurs because of conflicting
or inadequate bases for claiming authority in the society.

Second , govern-

ment structures may disintegrate because there i s excessive and uninstitutionalized competition for power.

Third, national leaders and the govern-

mental divisions of authority may collapse because the justi fications for
the ideological or pragmatic claims to authority have been based on unacceptable readings of history or faulty predictions of future development s .
Fina lly, and probably most basicall y , a legitimacy crisis may arise because
people have been inappropriately socialized; their feelings about authority
are not functional for the efforts of the current leaders .
I f we analyze the situation in Bangladesh, almost all the causes
mentioned by Lucian Pye preva i l .

There was a complete breakdown of the

governmental machinery when the August coup took place in 1 9 7 5 .

Since

then there have been many uninstitutionalized groups which have tried to
capture power by force.

p

s an of time .

Many abortive coups took place within a short

From Augu s t , many group s , especially the radical group,

tried to capture power unconstitut iona lly.
leadership.

A vacuum has been created in

The orderly means of transfer of power has been blocked.

ll
1ucian W . Pye, " Legitimacy Crisis in the Developing Society, " in
Firkle and Gable (ed s . ) ,
12

Ibid . , p .

542 .

E£· c i t .
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because no group has the legitimacy to assume power .

The assumption of

power by Mushtaque on August 1 5 , President Sayem on November 3, and
President Zia on January 1 , 1 9 7 7 does not have a great deal of legitimacy .
There is no unity among the elites for the stable constitutional means of
transfer o f power.

The leadership is divided and busy in gaining power

by any means .
Legitimacy crisis arose because of the failure of leadership to
fulfill people ' s expectations.

The people of Bangladesh expected a better

life after being separated from Pakistan .
satisfy the expectation of the people.

But Sheihk Muj;ib failed to

Moreover, he disregarded the very

inherent value of the people, for example, the most respected Islami·c ·
religion of the majority of the population of Bangladesh.

·

Sheikh Muj:ib

promised a better way of living within three years time, but three years
passed without any improvement for the people.

This greatly undermined

the claims of authority of the leadership .
The ex1st.ing ' mifitai;y regime faced the problem: of legitimacy because
there was no popular sanction behind their ass�mption of power.

That is

why after assuming power, General Zia called a nation-wide referendum which
gave him 99 percent of yes votes.

Still, they could not fully establish

his legitimate authority because there is distrust among the people on the
turnout rate.
All these feelings convinced Zia to base his authority by popular
support .

He allowed political activities from April 1 9 7 8 .

The election

on June 3 , 1 9 7 8 gave Zia the legitimacy which he wanted very much.

"Zia

secured 76 . 7 2 percent while General (Rtd . ) Osmani secured 2 1 . 65 percent
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of the tota l vote s cast . "
the election.

13

Stil l ,

there are several allegations about

In an interview with the newsmen after the election, Gen-

eral Osmani remarked that "the election was not free and fair . "

He put

forward several demands such as restoration of human and fundamental
rights,
law.

release of all political prisoners , and withdrawal of martial

" 14
Secondly,

the loss of charisma�

The rise of charisma tic leaders

is one of the fundamental characteristics of the developing countries .
Instability is created when charisma loses its image.

The charisma of

Muj ib united all the people o f Bangladesh under his command .

The causes

of instability and disunity can be related to the loss of charisma ip
national leadership .
The term

"

charisma " will be applied to a certain quality of an

individual ' s personality by virtue o f which lre i s set apart from ordinary
men and treated as -

if endowed with the supernatural, superhuman or at

15
.
.
.
1 powers or qua li ties.
.
11y except 1ona
1 east speci f 1ca

These are not access-

ible to ordinary persons but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary and on the basis o f them; the individual concerned is treated as a
leader.

It is very often thought of as resting on magical powers.
I f a leader i s to serve as a charismatic leader, he
must be perceived as goal-fulfilling by the masses
i . e. , he must be perceived as offering a relevant
solution to the problems of the identifying indi
vidual s .
At least three' factors are involved:
image formation, image communication and image
reinforcemen t . 11 1 6

i3

The Bangladesh Observer , June 6 ,

14

1978.

Ibid.

15
Monte Palmer, The D ilemmas of Political Development
Peacock Publishers,
16

Ibid . ; p.

Inc . ,
79.

1973) , p .

102 .

(Il l . :

F. E .

First, the aspirant to charisma, he states, must be able to
create an image o f strength and generally epitomize wha tever other
virtues are perceived as relev.ant amo � � the target audience.
.

Without

the image o f strength, real or imagined , the leader is in a poor posi
tion to serve as a beacon o f reference and security for those plagued
by the confusion of social or psychic organization.
An image of strength is made up of many things, both real and
imagined.

Most of the well-known charismats have slain real dragon s .

Nasser evicted the British from the Egyptian base, nationalized the
Suez Canal and emergea victorious from the 1956 tripartite invasion of
Egypt by England, France and Israel.

Sheikh Muj ib was successful in

creating the image because he was . the leader to demand liberation from
Pakistani rule.
I f a charismatic leader i s to attract a national following he
must connnunicate the image he has created and the program he has pro
posed to individuals with dif fering problems, aspiration s , and backgrounds .
Attempts to appeal to diverse audiences entail the danger of making con
tradictory statemen t s .
force.

This problem, however, has seldom come to the

Assuming a strong need to identify with a leade r ,

target indivi

duals appear more than willing to rationalize the conf licting aspects o f
'
the leader s image.

They maintain that he really conforms to their inter

pretation of his image but he must say nice things to other groups as a
matter of exped iency .

Charismats ,

in turn, have sought to mitigate such

conflict by operating at a vague and abstract level.

In this respect,

Sheikh Muj ib faced a problem because he had to satisfy d i f ferent rival
factions which competed with each other for power .
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A third condition emphasized by Max Weber for a charismatic
leader is that he must reinforce the image or continue to provide a
meaningful crutch for the faithful.

If his power wanes,

i f competi-

tive purveyers of charisma appear more relevant , or if concrete programs fall in direct conflict with ther mass values,

then the basis

for the chari sma i s undermined and the quality and intensity o f identificat ion patterns decreases or becomes totally extinguished.

A char-

ismatic leader who fails to reinforce his image continually will more
than likely cease to be goal-fulfilling for those who identify with him .
To the extent that this occurs, he ceases to be a charismatic leade r .
He may remain i n power b y virtue o f coercive o r economic assets but no
longer enjoys the ability to mobilize the masses by means o f identitive
assets based on their identification with him.
Mu j ib was a complete failure.

In this respec t , Sheikh

He failed to reinforce his image as a

charismatic leader by gratifying the public demands.

He could not keep

his promises as expected by the people.
"

In order to reinforce the image the charismatic leader must

undertake different strategies11
crisis.

17

such as first, the strategy of permanent

Sheikh Mujib tried to relate everything to Pakistani colonial rule.

But it did not satisfy the people because the question o f the Pakistan
domination does not arise at all after 1 9 7 1 .
Second, VIP strategy, i . e . ,

the role as an international leade r .

For example, SukarDP.:> opened u p the Bandung Conference i n 1 9 5 5 .

Sheikh

Mujib at tended the Islamic Conference in Lahore in 1 9 7 9 and the Common-

17

Ibid. , p .

83.
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wealth Conference in 1 9 7 2 , but he could not create any image as an
international leader because he lacked the potential to create Bandung
or Non-alignment like Nehru o� Sukarno .
Third,

the development plan as polit ical strategy .

In this

respect, Sheikh Mujib was a complete failure because he could not under
take any development strategy.

Moreover, he failed with the problems o f

inflation and food shortages which crippled his image.
Fourth,

the elimination of competing prophets strategy ,

eliminate the opposition.

i.e. ,

to

Sheikh Mujib banned all political activities

and created one party rule by establishing the BKSAL , but this was criti
cized by the people.
Fifth,

"

•

•

•

the strategy o f ideology building--Nass e r , Nkrumah

Sukarno, Castro, all . charismatic leaders , attempted to reinforce their
images and to overcome some of the heterogeneity of their countries by
providing a new ideology capable of integrating all the values . 1

1 18

In

a similar way, Sheikh MuJ ib created Mu3 ibism, which found bitter opposi
tion even from his own party.
The nature o f the charismatic relationships and the purpose o f the
charismatic strategies is to focus power in the hands o f a single indivi
dual .

As long as the leader ' s perceptions are in tune with reality and he

uses his position to pursue policies based upon sound advice, his power
might well result in the benefits o f charisma.

This, however,

is not

always the case.
As structural rigidities block outlets for change and mobility
within the system, the only alternatives for change become those of vio-

18

rbid . , p .

86 .
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lence.

When violence succeeds, the recriminations that follow are

generally as violent as to fear as under the solidarity-building work
of the deposed charismat , a pr�cess that must begin anew.

The char

ismats were reluctant to give political institutions sufficient power
to challenge their authority .

They thereby crippled the ability o f the

major political institutions of their states to live in an independent
existence .

They also discourage

passing of a charismat , therefor�
sive conflicts run high.

the rise o f a second man .

With the

the potential for intensive and divi

The more intense such conflict becomes , the

greater the prospect that parochial conflicts submerged by the presence
of the leader will be rekindled as contestants seek support for their
respective positions.
The entire popularity of the Awami League was based on the per
sonal appeal of Muj ib.

There was no institutionalized structure.

His

inability to build new institutions, to replace the one destroyed during
the liberation struggle such as a respected bureaucracy, the viability of
the opposition party, an impartial j udiciary, a . free enterprise economy,
an open education system, brought about a crisis of leadership.

It gave

rise to a situation in which public confusion has increased and the chances
of social mobilization have decreased.
The present government of Major General Ziaur Rahman, though a
military leader, still bases his authority on charisma.

He developed

charisma during the liberation period when Sheikh Mu�.ibar Rahman was
taken prisoner by the army on March 2 6 , 1 9 7 7 .

Ziaur Rahman was the first

man to declare independence of Bangladesh from the Chittagong radio station.
He formed the resistance movement in Chittagong against the Pakistani Army .

so

He is trying to base his autho�ity:· o� econq�i� 4�velopment _and.
sovereignty of the country.
economic development .

He has undertaken massive programs of

St i l l , there are many problems confronting the

existing regime.
An analysis of the military regime shows that the armed forces
as a whole seldom rule.

The military regime i s a government in which

particular military elite rule.

These elites may or may not have the

support of the rest of the armed forces.

Gaining and maintaining that

support i s , in fact, generally a continual concern to the ruling military
elites.

There are cleavages within the army .

Moreover, the cleavages

within the military are often exacerbated after it seizes power and
becomes further divided between those officers who assume positions in
the government and those who do not.

Zia is facing the problem of bring

ing unity among the army which is highly politicized.

Moreover , there

always arise conflicts between the o f ficers and the Jawans which is highly
destructive to army disc�pline.
Generally, military regimes are anti-political.

They distrust

political activities and try to avoid any kind of popular participation.
In this respect , Zia is more tactful .

Though at first he banned all poli

tical activities, he could feel that he could not continue his power in
this way.

That is why he announced the formation of a new party, Tpe_ Nation

alist Democratic Party, and opened up political activities after Apri l ,
1978.
He also held a presidential election on the basis of universal
adult sufferage on June 3 , 1978 which gave him a landslide victory over
his opponent .

S t i l l , there i s some question as to whether he i s following
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the footsteps of Ayub Khan.

There is also doubt whether he will also

suffer the same kind o f fate as Ayub Kbah in 1969 .

Ayub Khan came to

power in the wake of the decla.ration of martial law ih 1958 .
assuming power he changed himself to civilian rule.
was very fearful o f democracy .

As an army man he

S o , he created a cloak of dictatorship

in the name of "basic democracy . "
which was suppressed by Ayub .

After

People gradually demanded democracy

As a result of this , the people rose in

rebellion which. ultimately forced Ayub Khan"t�,· l"e$Jgp in 1969 .
Bangladesh, which was:.created ' in 1 9 7 1

Thir d , the threat of India.

through th.e direct intervention of Ind ia with the active support of Soviet
Russi.a, : sooiufound itself in a position o f a dependent state of India .
First, the Indian army, before th.ey were withdrawn from Bangladesh, took
to India the vast amo.unt o f arms and

ammunition

left by the surrendering

Pakistani army and kept the naseant Bangladesh army virtually disarmed.
Second , the Indian government imposed a trade agreement on Bangladesh
providing for free trade with.in ten miles of the border of each country .
Through th.i.s border trade agreement (which was .terminated at the end of
the first year of independence in th.e face of stiff public pr�test in
Bangladesh) , India siphoned off from Bangladesh. a large part o f foreign
grants and huge quantities of j u t e , rice and other essential commodities .
The Indian government also slackened the anti-smuggling operation along
the Indian border s , as smuggling on the India-Bangladesh border went in
favor o f India.

India always defaulted in the export to Bangladesh of

items provided in the annual trade agreements, while Bangladesh exceeded
targets in its exports to India .
larly hi.t t h e Bangladesh economy .

India t s failure to export coal particu
In spite o f all the concessions made to
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India , the government of Sheikh Muzib could not even get a fair deal in
the Ganges water dispute except for a face-saving interim government .
Naturally, the militai:y elite who took over i·n �angladesh in the
August coup of 1975, especially those who came into power on November 7 ,
1975 after the abortive Indian-backed putsch of Brigadier Khaled Musharraf,
took every possible measure to get the country out of the position of
dependence on India, reflecting the changed mood of the people of Bangladesh.

Since then the Indian government applied pressure to make the new

government subservient to Indian desires .

First , the Indian government

began to divert the Ganges water at Farakka without prior consultation
with the Bangladesl. government, contrary to the April 1974 agreement .
"The diversion of the Ganges water during the
dry season (November 1975 to May 1976) adversely
affected the irrigation system, navigation, indus
try, power generation, intrusion of salinity,
fisheries, forestry, livestock, drinking water
and public health in 37 percent of the total
area of Bangladesh with 33 percent of the popu
lation . 1 9
Second, the Indian government began to shelter the diehard Mui,ibites (followers of Sheikh Mu�.ib) led by Kader Siddiqui, a tough guerrilla
leader of the 1971 liberation war who opened camps for training in guerrilla
warfare and subversion.

Since January 1976 these Bangladesh dissenters have

launched raids on Bangladesh. border posts with the support of the Indian
Border Security Force .

In the latter part of the year some of. the dissente�s

infiltrated into Bangladesh in order to carry on sabotage activities.

1 9Rashiduzzaman , .££.· cit . , p . 2 1 6 .
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However, the relationship with India under the Desai government
is much better than the previous government.

Still, there is constant

fear of India among the people because India is a great neighbor encircling Bangladesh on three sides.
Fourth, factionalism, the main cause of instability is widespread
factionalism in every sector.

In every group there are factions.

There

are divisions within the bureaucracy which are divided into collaborators,
non-collaborators, and returnees from Pakistan.

They are also aligned

with the political leaders so when a change of government takes place,
it leads to a change in the bureaucracy.
Factionalism exists within the army too, i.e. , the freedom fighters,
the returnees from Pakistan, and the national defense forces.
very much politicized.
the officers.

The army is

There are also differences between the soldiers and

The radical parties created cells in the enlisted ranks who

have revolted against the officers.
a politicized army.

It is very difficult to control such

The army and the bureaucracy are very much aligned

with the political leaders who use them for their necessity.
There are strong decentralizing tendencies within the political
centers of the underdeveloped states.
"The stability of any central coalition rests upon
the various elites perception that their participa
tion in the coalition is yielding rewards ; on their
ability to maintain control over their own individual
followings; and whose elements of patrimonialism are
present, on the ability of the patrimonial le�der to
keep his personal retainers from entrenching them
selves and establishing their own political fiefdoms.
The obvious difficulties in meeting these conditions
explain much of the factional conflict that often
appears in underdeveloped states. "2 0

2 0Robert P. Clark, Jr., Development and Instability ( Tennessee:
Dryden Press, 1 974), p. 101.
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The natural pattern of decentralization is exacerbated in a
variety of ways .

First , the central leadership frequently attempts to

gain control over both the center and the periphery by expanding the
government ' s scope through the organization of development agencies and
the integration of voluntary association directly into the governmen t .
By offering the elites new sources of patrimony the new agencies increase
both the complexity of the coalitions and the possibility of competition
between elites .
Decentralization has also been exacerbated by political leadership
that has proven, more often than not, to be less than competent.

Ideologi

cal rigidity and limited understanding have caused many rulers of under
.aeveloped states to fritter away their small initial political capital of
legitimacy, disruptive capacity, inertia and coercion by investing it in
non-essential undertakings .

More than this , a patrimonial leader ' s efforts

to maintain his autonomy and authority seem, at times , self-defeating.

The

consequences of such incpmpetent :.leadership and rapid expansion of govern
ment activity is usually an escalation in fac�ional conflic t .

Anxious to

maintain their followings , but confronted with limited resources at the
center , elites utilize a variety of different resources for their own
personal. end s .

Reciprocity between elites breaks down and each seeks to

mobilize resources on his own behalf rather than on behalf of a ruling
coalition or patrimonial leader .

Nation-building becomes faction-building.

Because of its bigness , the Awami League has opened up different
fron� .as':'for ·:exa.\Xlpl.e, the student league, the labor league, youth league
and peasant league.

This decentralization is helpful for gaining and

�gathering mor e support , but it is difficult to maintain a hierarchical
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discipline within the fronts .

Moreov e r , these fronts tried to estab-

lish an autonomous organization apart from the Awami League .

For

exampl e , the chairman of the youth leagu e , Sheikh Fazlul Hoq Moni ,
openly stated that he had no connection with the Awami League.

Thus ,

we see factional conflict has been aggravated by decentralization o f
power . Factional conflicts are sometimes based on ideology.
"The

1958 dispute between Milton Margai and

Albert Margai in the ruling Sierra Leone
People ' s Party which culminated in the
latter ' s organizing an opposition party
was based in large part on the desire o f
Albert Margai and supporters t o speed up
21
social reform . 11
The influence o f too many ideologies has led to the growing factionalism
in Bangladesh.

The factionalism in the Student League which led to the

coming up of J SD was based in the ideology of introducing scientific
socialism.

The ideological contrasts will be discussed in detail in a

later chapter.
More generally, however , factional conflict seems to have its
genesis in personal conflicts among the elites and in their efforts to
consolidate their own personal support .

Faction building focuses around

the development o f personal machines through which a particular leader can
attract supporters .

For the most part, such machines are depednent on the

leader ' s continued access to patronage.

Because they need such access

factional leaders tend to stay within the government unless they enjoy
enough traditional status or personal wealth to maintain a following or
unless they perceive the possibility o f opposit ional elites actually cap-

21

Ibid . , p .

106.
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turing control of the government .

In general , factional conflict remains

within the confines of the regime with conflicting elites utilizing their
control over ministries and p�rty organs fo provide spoils to their existing supporters and to attract new ones .
is an integral part of this process .

Corruption, it should be noted,

Elites manipulate revenues to their

own advantage and to the advantage of their supporters .
There was widespread corruption in the government .

Even Sheikh

Mu�ib admitted himself that he·.:could not build up the country because of
widespread corruption in every sector .
The process of modernization is highly destabilizing to political
institutions and to the broader social system of which they form a part .
S . N . Eisenstad t , for example, states that :
"Disorganization and dislocation constitute a basic
of modernization and this process brings with
it of necessity the growth of social problems , cleav
ages and conflicts between various groups and movements
of protest. The causal factors are the well-known com
ponents of modernization: urbanization (which destroys
rural family and clan ties) , industrialization {which
has undermined traditional occupational security and
work discipline mores) , political . centralization and
democratization (which has dislo!fged traditional elites
from their favored positions) , secularization (which
has weakened the position of long-established values
and standards of performance) , and social mobilization
(which has heightened mass awareness of depriv� 2ions
and socio-cultural cleavages in the society) . "

part

All these dislocations and disorganizations , according to Eisen�
stadt, produce the continual growth of social problems which he defines
as breakdowns or devLations of social behavior involving a considerable
number of people which are of serious concern to many members of the
society in which the aberrations occur.

2

2Monte

Palmer , ££.• c it . , p . 7 3 .
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Samuel Huntington, in his excellent extended essay on political
decay, finds there to be a strong correlation between rapid political
mobilization and political ins�ability.

According to · Runtington , the

one inescapable component of political modernization is the expansion
of political participation, the rapid mobilization of ever-increasing
numbers of individuals who beat at the doors of the slowly evolving
political structure with incessant demands for change .

The integral

parts of social mobilization--heightened awareness of relative levels
of poverty and unequal distribution of wealth, increased exposure to
political activism and its practical results and an enhanced sense of
the latent power which lies in the hands o f the mob are supposed to produce the systematic disruption which accompanies the modernization process .
Robert E . Clark identifies different sources of instability:
First,

23

cognitive dissonance or stress engendered by an incongruence

between image and expectation on the one hand , and perceptions of reality
on the other.

The lack of congruence between expectations and reality

can be severely disruptive and can be illustrat.ed with examples drawn
from states in the process of rapid disjunctive modernization.
"Indonesia has been wracked by mass kiL.ings which
have had heavy overtones of the bloody confrontation
of competing and antithetical value systems . The
killings began after the failure of the attempted
coup d ' etat launched by Indonesian Communist Party
against the Indonesian army in September 1965. In
retribution, and in light of Indoneisan leader
Sukarno ' s inability or unwillingness to punish the
communists, the army initiated a series of raids
against the communist party headquarters and strong
holds . The result was the unleashing of intense

23

Robert E . Clark, .££. • cit . , p . 2 1 5 .
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popular hatred o f the communists by the more
traditional mystical Hindus who vented their
anger by killing an estimated 250,000 to 350,000
communist leaders and militants as well' as many
sympathizers . 11 2 �
In the same way the causes of ins �ability in Bangladesh can be related
to as the gap between expectations and reality.

Sheik Mujib could not

satisfy any of the demands of the people who expected so much from him.
He dissatisfied the army by creating Bangladesh Rakkhi Bahini and giving
more power to them; dissatisfied the bureaucracy by threatening them with
the precaution of the loss of job anytime; dissatisfied the people with
the rising cost o f living; by not giving due respect to the majorities
religion .

All these are responsible for creating frustrations which led

to instability.
Second , deprivation :

In this case, the actor perceives himself

as being physically or affectively interfered with, severely restricted
in activity, in stimuli or in social relations , or in extreme cases, actually deprived of the physical factors required for survival .

The indivi-

dual senses that his environment has become threatening and that a critical
region has been approached in which his well being and stability can no
longer be taken for granted .
in Bangladesh.

This deprivation was very much predominant

Moreover , they realized that their economic condition had

deteriorated more compared :to the Pakietani period .
Ted Gurr has examined in great detail the nexus between the psychological phenomena of frustration aggression and relative deprivation on the
one hand , and the recourse to civil violence on the other.

He argues that

frustration-aggression causes tension in human beings and this mechanism

24
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is triggered by the presence of relative deprivat�on .

Relative depriva

tion, which Gurr defines as " the perceived d iscrepancy between value
expectations and value capabil�ties,

thus appears to ·be a principal

factor in impelling men to such levels of instability that they are led
to inflict damage on each other . 1 1

25

Gurr has identified at least three broad patterns of relative
deprivation; each involves a rapid widening of the gap between one ' s
expectations and his capabilities .

The first type of deprivation, which

Gurr calls aspirat ional , comes about when value expectations are increasIn July

ing rapidly and value capabilities remain relatively stationary .

1962 the civilian armed forces of Peru deposed the outgoing civilian govern
ment of Manuel Prado in order to assure the subsequent election of Fernando
Belaunde Terry who had barely missed securing a plural ity of the votes in
the national presidential election in June .
high aspirations for the Belaunde government .

At that time the army held

In the first place, Bel aunde ' s

brand o f reform promised to bring the modernization o f' the country ' s eco
nomic and social system, which the army leaders believed would forestall
the popular upris ing which had been threatening Peru for decades .

Further ,

Belaunde pledged to secure national control and ownership over the petro
leum reserves of the country by nationalizing the holdings of the Inter
national Petroleum Corporation .

On both counts , while the army ' s expecta

tions soared , their nation ' s capabilities remained stat ionary .

By 1 9 6 7

the country ' s economic problems had worsened to such an extent that urban
unrest , inflation and s t r ikes alternated with alarms of guerrillas filter
ing in from the rural areas .

2 5 Ibid .

, p. 217 .

In the area of national control over natural
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resources ,
situation .

the Belaunde government proved as unable to deal with the
The armed forces leaders drew the obvious conclusion, that

civilian politics , as usual , were failing to meet their high expectat ions
which had prompted them to put Belaunde into power in the first place.
On October 3 , 1968 ,

the armed forces o f Peru overthrew the Belaunde govern-

ment and moved to establish an army regime o f long standing endowed jwith
the necessary power and ideological conviction to deal decisively with
Peru ' s aggravated economic and social problems .
In the same way in Bangladesh, the Awami League government failed
in every respec t .

Inflation rose and government nationalization o f indus-

tries was an utter failure due to corruption and mismanagement. o f the
administrators o f the nationalized industries .

These factors led to the

coming up o f the military government like the developing countries o f the
world .
'
Progressive deprivation , Gurr s second model , is seen to develop
from the much more complex situation in which value expectat ions and value
capabilities rise sharply together for a period, followed by a sharp drop
in capability, thereby opening a widening gap between the two variables .
"As Tanter and Midlarsky have indicated , Cuban/G�'P /Cap increased s t eadily
every year from 1 9 4 8 through. 1951 and then turned downward sharply from
1951 through 1953 (the year of Castro ' s first assault on the Cuban government in his attack on the Moncada barracks ) .

Tanter and Midlarsky reason

that this dramatic illustration o f progressive deprivation in the economic
sphere prepared Cuba for the onset o f the guerrilla revolutionary war which
1 26
'
followed soon after and made them more receptive to Castro s movement . 1

26
·

Ibid. , p .
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61

The third form of relative deprivation, which Gurr has labeled
decremental deprivation, involves the maintenance of stable value expect
ations by a gro�p confronted �ith declining value capabilities .

For

example, the calls hy Tanzania ' s President Julius Nyreree to recreate

a

kind of communal , rural socialism in his country have also failed to guar
antee a full and equitable distribution of rapidly dwindling agricultural
resources .

Thus, in the face of declining capabilities ( land ) � arid stable

expectations (standard of living and a non-adaptive value structure) , the
typical East-African farmer is confronted by stress induced by deprivation
of the decremental variety.

The result has been internal conflict within

family and kin groups, with the consequences that these essential elements
o f Tanzania ' s rural social structure are beginning to erode under the
strain of land shortage.
In the same manner, Mujib ' s call for the establishment of one-party
rule with supreme command under him was rejected by the democratic-minded
people.

His ideology of Mujibism created a negative response.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF BUREAUCRACY
The bureaucracy is an important element in the development process.

In a new country like Bangladesh where viable political institutions

have not been developed bureaucracy plays a vital role.

As Gerald A. Heegar

remarks , "The growing role of governmental bureaucracy has been one of the
most noted and discussed characteristics of developing political systems . " 1
For political develo�ment bureaucracy is an important instrument .

The com-

plexity of issues in the modern state and the bureaucrat ' s expertise or
superior access to exl?ertise necessitates a greater role for bureaucracy in
the initiation of .p olicy.
The

role of bureaucracy is very problematic.

should play a role in the execution of policy .

On

On

the one hand , it

the. other hand , it should

not play so much a role as to j eopardize the role of other institutions .
is very difficult to maintain a balance in the role of bureaucracy .

It

The

bureaucrats should play their par t , otherwise it will create problems in
the administration.

On the contrary its power should not be so much as to

overrule other organizations of power .
As a new-born country, Bangladesh faces problems oh both sides of
the role of bureaucracy.

Political and economic development cannot be

achieved without a competent bureaucracy.

Regardless of how lofty the

1 Gerald A . Heegar, "Bureaucracy, Parties and Political Developmen t , "
World Politic s , July 1 9 7 3 , pp. 600-60 1 .
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goals of the regime or how adept it is at generating enthusiasm for its
programs , policy decisions are not self-enforcing .

It is the bureaucracy

which must transform hopes into reality.
Political development needs effective execution of public policy
which requires an efficient bureaucrac y .

I n the developing countries the

bureaucracy plays a vital role, but is often plagued by many different
problems .
cracy .

Monte Palmer has identified different problems of the bureau-

He mentions " ( l) institutional and structural problems , (2) prob-

lems related to bureaucratic attitudes and behavior , ( 3 ) the lack of inno
vation and flexibilit y , and (4) problems o f political intervention . 11
The Bangladesh bureaucracy has a long tradition.
extension of the British and Pakistani bureaucracy.

2

It is the logical

The major trend is

that administration dominated East Bengali ' s political environment from
the beginning of the British days until the emergence of Bangladesh.

"The

dominant approach followed in the British days and lat er in the Pakistan
.
.
3
era to the problem o f order and development was administrative . "
In the British period , the bureaucracy was a tool for controlling
the people .
policy.

The bureaucrats were trained to control rather than execute

The bureaucrats were used to be the sons of big landlords who used

to work as a tool of the British government to control the people.

In the

Pakistani period , the bureaucracy had more influence than politics and politicians in the overall running of the country .

Not only in the internal

�onte

Palmer , The Dilemmas of Political Development (Illinois :
F . E . Peacock Publishers , Inc , , 1967 .
3

A . T . R. Rahman , "Administration and Its Political Environment
in Bangladesh," Pacific Affairs , Summer 1974 .
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management of its sys tems , procedures and relationship but also in the
decisions involving basic political , economic and social issues .

The

bureaucracy in association wich the military played a decisive role.
Many senior bureaucrats moved into key ruling positions before Ayub
imposed the first martial law.

During the Ayub era , it was again the

bureaucrats who played the major role in the national decision-making
process .

Things did not change much during Y'ahya ' s regime although the

military leaders allegedly set the outer limits of the influence that
bureaucrats and other groups could exercise in the national system.

The

administration o f the countryside for the whole Pakistan period was in
the sole custody o f btlceaucrats.
The political environment was poorly organized .

The ruling poli

tical party did not have sufficient organization, skills and resources to
provide a reasonable base for exercising effective control over the bureau
cracy.

Interest groups in the society were not organized to any degree .

The dominant ruling model was the vice-regal system .and the experience in
government o f society was insignificant .

Positively speaking, the admini

stration maintained its basic colonial features--hierarchy of services,
· limited and strict entry points for each service, elite character of superior services � ·: The. . struttruce. .6f ..the :seriices provided the basic parameter
for mobility, connnunication and control functions within the system and for
negotiation, bargaining and advancement with external groups outside the ·
system.

The control by the elite cadre was maintained by the-'Ulonopoly con

trol o f all key administrative positions and by claiming for its members a
major invoI:vement.inithE

new

development institutions .

"Thus the CSP secured

60 percent representation in tli.e economic pool, . held key positions in the

65

planning commission and claimed a major share of the chairmanships and
directorships of new public enterprises .

The members of the bureaucracy

obtained the lion ' s share of fa.cilities often given through foreign aid
to develop necessary skills, both within and outside the country so that
they could do their new jobs well without depending on expertise from
4
such outside agencies as the universities . "
"Pakistan as a society is extremely insecure.

Within that society,

however , the higher civil servants are as secure as rules , regulations and
constitutions can make them . 11

5

They , in fact , fear disciplinary action

less than most of their counterparts in the Wes t .

It follows that �any

officers will devote less than full energy to their work, knowing their
own position is secur e .

They may minimize the need for urgent action.

This tendency is aggravated by the almost universal reluctance of a subordinate to tell his superior · :officer how bad things really are.

Aecom-

plishments will be readily reported and exaggerated; failures will be
covered up.

'
Hence , all indications are that progress .: is made and there

is no need for special measures .

To some exte�t this complacency might

have been offset at the highest echelon by contract with the ministers and
other related official s , but in Pakistan these politicians frequently
lacked the necessary grass roots contacts with the voters and were not
too well informed themselves about local need s .
The bureaucracy has no contact with the local people.
crats have hardly any idea of the village people.

4

The bureau-

The success of any pro-

Ibid . , p. 1 00 1 .

5
Henry F. . Goodnow, The Civil Service of Pakistan (New Haven :
University Press, 1964) .
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gram d ep ends on the cooperation of the villagers b ecause the policy is
directed towards them .
The civil s ervice, the kingpin in the administration of Bangla
d esh is caught right in the middle o f this drama of slow and painful
emergence o f a viable system in the new state.

During the 1 2 years of

military rule, the service, compos ed of trained government officials ,
provided a stabilizing factor, working in a kind of partnership with
the army .

For this r eason, the citizens o f the new state look upon it

as a l egacy o f the past.

Bureaucracy , which has b een synonymous with

civil service, is therefore a much hated word in the political dictionary
of Bangladesh.
Yet a large numb er o f civil s ervants of former East Pakistan played
another kind o f role in the political struggle o f their people.

In the

days of Ayub many o f them openly sympathi z ed with the Awami League .and
p ersonally remained on good terms with the Shiekh.

Privately many of

these civil s ervants provided the Awami League l eadership with materials
which helped the Sheikh to argue his case for autonomy of the province.
Some wrote anonymously for political journals including the Forum to highlight the economic disparity b et w een the two wings of Pakistan.
The officers who stayed in the country faced many troubles.
who f l ed t o India got quick promotion.

Tho s e

The problem posed by officers who

had once s erved with the provisional government in Calcutta had not been
resolved even by April .

"Later that month the government-owned Bangladesh

News Agency r eleased an o f f icial order direc t ing the officers who were in
the employment of c entral and provisional governments in Bangladesh on
March 2 5 , 1 97 1 , but were later recruited under Bangladesh (provisional

67
government) in Mu i ibnagar to go back to their posts they were holding on
March 25, 1971 .

But except in a few cases, this directive was never put

6

into effect . 11

In effect, a sense of drift inside the Secretariat continued right
through the whole year .

If the army officials could put up with arbitrary

appointments and promotions, they felt thoroughly demoralized by the methods
used to screen out the so-called undesirable, officials, including the for
mer collaborators of Pakistani ' s army rule, corrupt civil servants or anyone who was allegedly guilty of inefficiency or gross misconduct .

In

September 1972 nearly ten months after the liberation, there was a kind
of panic sweeping through the whole administration.
The fundamental drawback of the planning commission is the lack
of experience of its individual members in government planning .

The other

weakness of the commission is that its members have had no formal training
in any kind of socialist planning .
nomy at work.

They have not seen any socialist eco

Even in the:·_univet:sities where they studied , none of them

had any specialized course in socialist planning .

Moreover , the relation

of the planning commission with the civil service is not cordial .

The

members of the planning commission were convinced in their mind that the
entire senior cadre in the existing adm.inistration was out to sabotage the
operation of the public sector .

Having the status of State Ministers , i . e . ,

ministers without cabinet ranks , the members of the planning commission
rightly considered themselves senior to the secretaries of the various
departments.

6

Unfortunately, even the Sheikh often gave the impression

s . M . Ali, After the Dark Past (Dacca, Bangladesh, 1973) .
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that he -personally attached more importance to the secretaries while he
could half-j okingly ref er to the members of the planning commission as
"our professors , �.' , ·ori.:wor:se·.still, "our theoreticians . 117
If the members of the planning commission adopted an unhelpful
attitude on the question of creating administrative cohesiveness , the
civil servants also never missed the opportunity of obstructing the work
of the planning commission, sometimes out of spite, and sometimes their
approaches differed .
"One tragic casualty of this running feud between the planning commission and the civil service was the U . S . $320 million rehabilitation plan.
The program, which covered a six-month period from January to June 1 9 7 2 ,
was prepared by the planning commission in late February and submitted to
8
the Ministry of Finance for monetary sanction . "

In May a member o f the

planning commission complained that the top civil servants in the Ministry
had not yet passed the program .

This meant that during that crucial period

the rehabilitation work was carried out on the basis of a series of ad hoc
decisions which were totally unrelated to the priorities set forth in the
draft program.
Factionalism plagued the administration .

First, there was a split

between the Mujib-Nagar and Non-Mujib Nagar administration.
second sehism was added by the returnees from Pakistan.

In 1973 , a

"The j ockeying for

position by the three groups undermined the coherence and efficiency of the
services . "

9

The morale of the services was already low because of their job

7 Ibid . , p . 201 .
8

Ibid . , p . 204.

9

Rounaq Jahan , "Bangladesh in 1973 :
Asian Survey, Feb . 1977
•
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insecurity.

After liberation, the civil service of Pakistan was abol

ished and in the absence of the new structure, the top bureaucrats felt
insecure.

Additionally, the civil services were used to : freedom from

political control during the Pakistan days and found it difficult to
adjust to the changed set up in a parliamentary system where they were
placed under political leadership .
The alienation of the civil bureaucracy was also caused by the
enormous concentration of power in the hands of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman.
His family members also regularly interfered with the civil servants for
t heir personal ends and political purposes .

It was impossible to get

anything done without clearance from Bargabhavan, the official residence
of Sheikh Mu}ib .

Even routine matters were referred to him for approval .

Senior officers spent more time waiting in line for his clearance than in
.
implementing poliC: ies .

The inexperienced political appointees who flour

ished in the post liberation period created a buffer between the senior
bureaucrats and the Prime Minister which unnecessarily. complicated the
decision-making proces s .
There was growing frustration among the bureaucrats-':because many
young civil servants who fled to India in 197 1 were given higher positions
over the seniors .

A Services Reorganization Commission was set up, but

its recommendations were unacceptable to various segments of the bureaucracy .
The National Pay Commission' s recommendations to fix the highest pay scale
at Taka 2 ,000 per month was intensely disliked .

Numerous technocrats. were

brought in with such higher status and facilities that the civil servants
felt uncomfortable about the incursion into their traditional positions .
As a ,;esult , the�e. �s. tndt!i!�en.ce. and continued non-coopeJ;ation. inside.

70

the bureaucracy .

While the misery of the salaried people increased , the

political appointees prospered through government patronage openly dis
tributed by the AL .

As economic conditions deteriorated , politicians

started blaming the bureaucrats and even questioned their loyalty to the
new state.

Since decision making was monopolized by Sheikh Muj ib and his

associates , the bureaucrats resented any attempt to lay blame at their
doors . ·
In early 1 97 5 , when BKSAL , the one national party was announced ,
Sheikh Muj.ib called upon the civil servants to join the party.

Following

the British tradition, Bangladesh civil servants were non-political and
they abhorred the very idea of joining the BKSAL.

Most of them somehow

avoided doing so until a coup overthrew Sheikh Mujib.
This post-coup government is a partnership between the military
and

civil bureaucracy.

The Council of Advisors consists of senior aca

demecians , retired civil servants , and technocrat s .
the prestige of the civil servants.

Ziaur Rahman restored

The regime arrested many civil ser

vants who joined the BKSAL and downgraded those officials who were unduly
promoted by Sheikh Mujib.
tilissed Qy the AL .

Zia reinstated those officials who were dis

He also took the initiative in restoring the confidence

of the bureaucracy by formulating elaborate rules respecting seniority,
qualifications and discipline .

Steps were taken for the recruitment and

training of young civil servants which had been lacking since 1 9 7 2 .
After the coup on August 1 5 , 1975 the power o f the bureaucracy
increased tremendously because the existing government is a coalition of
the army and the bureaucracy .

This created many problems of development

by giving widespread power to the bureaucracy.

As Fred · Riggs remarks ,

71

"A phenomenon o f the utmost significance in transitional societies is
the lack of balance between policy making institutions and bureaucratic
policy implementing structures .

The relative weakness 9f political organs

means that the political function tends to be appropriated in considerable
measure by bureaucrats .
of politic s .

Intra-bureaucratic struggles become a primary form

But when the political arena i s shifted to bureaucracies , · a

shift marked by the growing power of military officers in conflict with
civilian officials , the consequences are usually ominous for political
stability, economic growth, administrative effectiveness and democratic
values . "

10
The problem which Bangladesh is facing is the over-dominance of

the bureaucrats who are obstructing the healthy .growth of the political
institutions.

The bureaucrats are controlling the affairs of the country

from·�the Secretariat .

Whatever policy decisions are taken are initiated

by the bureaucracy which is creating excessive red tape within the system.
The administration is centrally controlled by the bur�aucracy.

The nucleus

of the administration is the Distric t , which is. headed by the Deputy Commissioner, who is generally a member of the civil service.
all commander in the District Administration.

He is the over-

He is responsible for main-

taining law and order, collection of revenue , trying cases, and administration of the District Board .

In a nutshel l , he is everything within the

distric t .

The general leadership has no role in the administration o f the

district .

There is no �ffective local government by the people .

10
Fred W. Riggs , Bureaucracy and Political Development (New Jersey :
Orinceton University Press, 1963) , p . 120.
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The next administrative unit is the Thana which is composed of
some villages.

The Thana is an administrative unit for maintaining

security within the Thana .

It i s headed by a police 'officer.

There i s

n o people ' s representative in the Thana.
The most basic unit of administration is the Union Counc i l .

It

i s composed of a chairman and some members who are elected by the people .
But this elective body has virtually no power.

Its main function is to

distribute relief goods from within the villages.
virtually non-existent.

Local government is

The policy is very much centralized .

It is very

difficult to get feedback on a particular policy as well as to execute
any policy.

The government policy is always without any reference to local

needs and demands.

In case of any emergency decision, the local institu-

tions have to wait for central authority to give direction to the policy .
The dependence of development programs on foreign financial aid
was unchanged.

"Multi-lateral and bilateral teams from every maj or aid

donor visited Bangladesh following the coups to reassess their roles.
Total foreign assistance from 1 9 7 2 to mid- 1 9 7 6 was $ 4 . 22 billion .
the coups the IlfF established a special trust for Bangladesh.

After

The World

Bank arranged an aid consort ium meeting in Paris for �angladesh and the
Islamic Development Bank, the International Development Association and
the Asian Development Bank all announced maj or credits.

While there were

some integrated pol icy-making bodies , each program was usually the preserver of a separate ministry which guarded against attempts to coordinate
implementation, thereby diluting its power . 1 1

11
Fall,

Robert

1976.

11

Officials focused on poli-

S . Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh , " Pacific Affairs,
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cies which affected their own immediate urban environments and their own
futures , not on the rural sector which they left when they began their
careers .

None of the portfolios for local self-government , rural develop

ment or relief and rehabilitation were held by any of the military chiefs
and their officials remained less prestigious and powerful than others.
The weakness of local institutions for implementing development
programs was due to their origins , composition and relation to their
national government .

The Thana remained the maj or administrative unit

for revenue, policy and development programs .
·tinued to be the focus of local attention.

The Union Councils con-

The Union Councils were dis

credited under Mujib because they had been instruments of Pakistan and
dis-credited under martial law because council members made p�ivate proflt from relief

Muj ib.

distribution and government loans and contracts under

"The pattern in one Thana and confirmed in four others was that

chairmen of the Thana councils were living in the police station for pro
tection, for going to their homes under guard in the daytime and running
their offices by carrying their seals and s tamps in their pocke t s . 1 1

12

Some frightened council members left the Thana to hide elsewhere .
A powerful group was temporarily neutralized and in the e.ight months
following the coups at least eight members of the Union Councils in this
Thana were reported murdered.
While they were the final link of the national gover�ment with the
villages, these councils had no real power in development programming .
Minor policing and taxing powers could be superceded by Thana or district
officials if necessary.

12 Ibid . , p . 896 .

Council members look to these officials for favor
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in carrying out their responsibilities and cooperated with them in
patronage and corruption.

District government officials did not really

identify with council members ·and continued to wear western-style dress ,
arrive at the villages in jeeps and depart before sunse t .

The martial

law administration hoped to inspire dedication among officials and set
a new office-opening hour at 7 : 30 a .m.

But this had been tried under

Mujib and then as now few officials changed their daily routine and
most arrived at 10 a . m . at almost all levels of society.

The conduct

of government officials, though disliked, remained mostly unchallenged .
The contradictions between development programs at the national
and the local levels are not reconciled .

Both senior military and civil

officials were trained in Pakistan to believe that deference was the
proper attitude of the people towards government authority.

This con-

tinued in Bangladesh because there were no sustained training programs
under Muj ib ' s regime .

Development programs from their perspective needed

to be organized in tidy hierarchical and specialized . systems .

The role

of foriegn aid donors increased the need they. felt for separate accountability in spite of the use of the term integrated in policie s .

Such needs

were opposed to stronger local institutions which could experiment and
learn which kinds of development would be effective in their areas.

The

national government did not transfer to the existing institutions any
major responsibilities in development , such as revenue investment or
resource control because this would constitute a potential challenge to
national authority.

"The politics of exhortation thus substituted for

the transfer of real responsibilities and power in development programs . 11

13

Ibid . , p . 897 .

13
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The machinery of administration has no coordination with needs
of society and the actual operation.

For example, food policy, i . e . ,

administrations in Dacca (cap.ital) have consistently- chosen a food
policy which supplied priority groups on the official statutory rationing
list of civil servan t s , military, police, industrial workers and hos
pitals.

This policy· guaranteed the health and strength of those urban

dwelling classes or those on government salaries and cemented the alli
ances between the bureaucracy, the military and the merchants who oper
ated the food distribution system.

Rural areas received under modified

rationing only grains which were not absorbed by priority groups .

At the

times of the year when food was in short supply in the countryside, this
was an example of punishing agriculture and rewarding industry.

The same

food policy tended to promote the growth of the bureaucracy and the mili
tary which were ·still as in Wilcox ' s terms , "the only two management
instruments the society possesses . 11

14

The government structure which controlled agricultural policy
was highly centralized and remote from food p�oducer s , though its insti
tutions directed programs which were to some extent competing for recogni
t ion and scarce resources.

The Ministry of Agriculture and the Bangladesh

Agricultural Development Corporation were j oined by two policy bodies
resurrected from the days of Pakistan--the Agricultural Policy Council
and the Rural Development Council.

These were additions to the elected

political agency of official rural development plans, the National Swan
irvar Committee.

Most of these bodies had interlocking memberships and

represented alternate arenas for career building by ambitious members.

14 Ibid . , p . 9 0 1 .

7 fi

These bodies became more significant that the Integrated Rural Development program which Mujib and foreign donors used as a channel for rural
finance in which there were reports in February of promotion irregularities at management levels .
The Swanirbar movement was administered by Mahbub Alam Chashi
from the President ' s palace in Dacca and involved all district level
offices in high-visibility rural work proj ec t s , family p lanning and
model development villages.

It had to work through the rural power

s tr,ucture and appeared to be a non-party mechanism for providing rewards
or incentives to powerful villagers who were faithful to the government .
The coup in Dacca was reflected by changes in recipients o f rewards in
the countryside.

Despite some admirable pleas and rhetoric the Swanir-

bar movement at the Bangladesh Economic Association in March between
Chashi and others included the charges that it reinforced the reliefmentality and was just another method of agricultural input dumping
without accountabilities.

15

The dual needs for s table· political rela-

tions down to the lowest level s , and for accountable implementation of
programs could not always be reconciled.

"The undefined term 11self-

reliance" was contrasted with the hierarchical though equally ambiguous
term "rural upli f t . 11

16

Such needs and incongruous slogans were at the

very heart of the politics of exhortation.

The enthusiasm of the Swanir-

bar Committee for cooperation between civil servants generated resistance
among those who were expected to share power and prestige with people of a
similar role in other agencies and departmen t s .

15
16

Ibid . , p . 904.
Ibid . , p . 9 1 0 .

LACK OF ORGANIZED PARTY
Lack of a well-organized party is also a problem of political
development.
force.

A well-organized political party is necessary as a unifying

It can marshall all the resources of the country into one direc-

tion, and mobilize people and the resource s .

Most of the developing

countries gained independence under the leadership of a well-organized
party.

If the party is factionalized, it i s not possible to unite the

nation into one ideology.

"Most of the developing areas have at one time

or another experienced at least brief periods in which two or more competing political parties possessed reasonably equal chances of gaining
control of the governmental apparatus through relatively fair elections.
Rather . than promoting developmental goals, the impact of party competition
has been largely debilitating.

Physical contr� l by the central government

over the human and material resources of the state has tended to weaken.
Mobilization of the population towards the goals of economic and social
development has tended to be fluctuating and sporadic . "

1

M. Weip.er and J . Lapalombara in their article, "The Impact of
Parties on Political Development , " discusses the different functions performed by the political parties.

They are political participation, mobili-

1
Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development (Illinois:
cock Publishers, Inc . , 1 9 7 1 , p . 1 1 5 .
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Pea-
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zation, legitimacy , national integration, conflic t , management and political socialization . "
participation.

2

A political party opens the avenue for political

Through the po � itical party, people can place their demands

on the political system.

But one of the unfortunate problems of the devel-

oping areas is that the first generation of elites operating under party
systems are confronted with participatory demands long before they have
had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalize party government .
The political party

also performs the function o f political

mobilization but sometimes in the name of political mobilization, the
politicil party supresses popular participation.

The party government

seeks to sanctify popular government and to associate itself with the
populace.

In fact, even the one-party state typically claims the mantle

of democracy, that is, of popular rule, though a small oligarchy unaccountable for its actions may be in actual control of the governmen t .

I n the

developing countries, to establish authority with legitimacy is also a
serious problem.

Political parties provide the rationale for establishing

legitimate authority.

The political party also. performs the function of

national integration by bringing the desirable elements into one platform.
It helps in the resolution of conflicts arising out of different groups .
Political parties are also an instrument of political socialization.

Its

role as a socializing force is more predominant especially during the early
phases of political development when they are among the few institutions
concerned with affecting political attitudes.
formed well by a well-organized party.

But these roles can be per-

If the party is not well organized ,

it creates more problems rather than find solutions for them.

2
Myron Weiner and J . Lapalombora, "The Origin and Development of
Political Parties , " in
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Bangladesh is characterized by a multi-party system.
lacks a well-organized 'party.

But it

If we are to understand the party system

of Bangladesh, we should analyze briefly the party system in pre
partitioned India.

In British India, the two major political parties,

Muslim League and the Congress, were organized on the basis of religion.
For example, the Congress represented the Hindus and the Muslim League
represented the Muslims.

Thougl1 the present Bangladesh (formerly East

Bengal) was separated from Pakistan , religion was the bond of unity
among them.

Accordingly , the Muslim League united the Muslims o f East

Bengal and the present Pakistan into one ideology, i . e . , separate home
land for the Muslims.

It led to the creation of Pakistan .

Soon after the creation o f Pakistan , East Bengal demanded autonomy
because it was separated from Pakistan by one thousand miles .

Moreover,

East Bengal, which had a majority of population, was afraid of being dom
inated by West Pakistan , which had a maj ority in the bureaucracy and the
army.

The Awami League came into existence in 1 9 5 1 qS the spokesman of

the provincial autonomy for East Pakistan .

The Awami League was the most

organized party till the creation of Bangladesh.
ultimately led to the establishment of Bangladesh.

Its six-point formula
But after the creation

of Bangladesh, the Awami League lost its attraction and ideology .

It tried

to unite the people under the ideology of Mujibism which failed to draw
much attention.
Different factions were fighting for different ideologies .

The

first open challenge occurred in May 1972 , when the Student League split
into pro-Mujib groups and anti-Mu j ib group on the basis of socialism or
Mujibism.

The advocates of scientific socialism later on formed the

Jatiyo Samaj tantisk Dal.
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There were several inherent contradictions within the Awami
League .

The popularity of the Awami League centered around Sheikh Muj ib

who was the symbol of unity am�ng dif ferent factions . · He was ruling with
his charisma.

But later on, he found problems with his charisma .

ing to Max Weber ,

Accord-

charisma is inherently unstable but its instability can

be overcome by what he defines as "routinizat ion of charisma, " a concept
which exemplifies the process by which charisma is transformed from an
extraordinary and purely personal relat ionship into an established authority structure that is no longer necessarily dependent upon personal charismatic qualifications in the incumbent leader.
This transformation can best be affected by what I . L . Horowitz
calls

"

party charisma,

a synthesis of practical political consideration

and symbolical ly-laden personalist authority . 1 1

3

Charismatic leaders

like Nasser, and Mujib ostensibly tried to routinize their char isma by
strengthening their party but they always ended up weakening it .

For

example, periodic reshuffling of cabinets both by Mujib and Nasser weakened the party structure by creating power div�sions .

4

Infighting within the charismat ' s own party also undermines the
process of institutionalization.

'
Both Nasser s Arab Socialist Union and

Muj ib ' s Awami League have suffered from internal conflict between rival
party factions.

In both cases the leader was considered by his party

factions as an institution in hims elf which did not help the process o f
routinization.

Instead,

it widened the division within the party because

3zillar Rahman Khan , "Leadership , Parties, and Politics in Bangla

desh," Western Political Quarterly, March 1 9 7 6 .
4

rbid.
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each faction vied for his support as happened in the Arab Socialist
Union between radical communists and Islamic Sociali s t s .

I n Mujib ' s

Awami League a split arose between the pro-Moscow socialists and pro
Washington democrats.

Khondokar Mushtaque , the Commerce Minister ,

believed to be pro-western and Tajaddin Ahmed, the Finance Minister,
believed to be pro-Moscow.

Ther.e was open rivalry among the different

front organizations such as the Student League, Labor League, Youth
League, and the Peasants League.

Having failed to coordinate the

different factions of the party and having failed to solve the country ' s
economic problems, Mujib tried t o mobilize the nation b y the declaration
of a one-party system, -the BKSAL.

But it was mainly the Awami League.

After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in the August 15 coup and the
assassination of four leaders of the Awami League on November 3 ,

1 9 7 5 in

Dacca Central Jail, the party was left with no leadership.
Khondokar Mushtaque Ahemd became the President of Bangladesh with
the backing of the many who were involved in the August 1975 coup.

He was

alleged by the Awami Leaguers as conspiring for the coup because he was
dissatisfied with Mujib ' s pro-Soviet-Indian policy.
thrown in the November 3 coup.

However, he was over

Later on he formed the Democratic League.

He tried to attract many Awami Leaguers who refused to j o in his party.
He is now undergoing imprisonment under the Zia government for his alleged
corruption.
The death of Sheikh Mujibar created a vacuum in his party.
was constant rivalry between different personalities and groups .
a constant danger of a split within the party.
12, 1978.

There
There was

The split came on August

A new central committee was announced� headed by Mr. Mizanur
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Rahman Chowdhury.
Abdur Razza k .

The other group is headed by Abdul Malek Ukil and

There are two groups within the Awami League.

One group

believes in one-party presiden�ial rule and the other· believes in multiparty parliamentary system.

Hizanur Chowdhury said, "that they believed

in the pure parliamentary form of government.

But the other group

believed in the one·-party presidential form o f government11

5

Mizanur

Rahman also blamed the other group for confusing Sheikh Mujibar Rahman .
He also remarked that he was opposed to the formation of the one-party
rule under the BKSAL.
Another faction from the Awami League was led by General M. A. G .
Osman i , who was opposed to Shiekh Mujib ' s one-party rule.
Awami

League and refused to join the BKSAL .

opened up, he formed the Janata Party.

He left the

When political parties were

His party ' s main principle was

the establishment of parliamentary democracy, safeguard of fundamental
right s .

H e contested the June 3 election a s a nominee o'f Gono Oikko Jote

(People ' s United Fron t ) which was composed of different parties, but he
was defeated by Ziaur Rahman.
President Ziaur Rahman opened up a new political party, Bangla
desh Jutiyatabadi Dal (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) .

He emphasized ( 1 )

firm mass unity inspired and consolidated on the basis o f Bangladeshi
nationalism of mass-oriented politics, (2) national economic emancipation,
self-reliance and progress achieved through the united and well-disciplined
efforts of the people, but his party is also centered around him.
The Nat ional Awami Party led by Maulana Bhasani until his death in
1 9 7 7 lacked an efficient organization.

s rbid.

It was intrigued with so many

83
factions.

Moreover , all the radical parties assembled there under the

shadow of Bhasani.

He professed I slamic socialism, but he could not

specifically mention the meani�g of Islamic socialism;

The people

think of his Islamic socialism in the same way as Bhutto ' s I slamic
socialism.

There was infighting between Kazi Zafar Ahmed , the General

Secretary and Mashiur Rahman , the Vice-Presiden t .

Kazi Zafar Ahmed

later on, in collaboration with Captain (Rtd . ) Abdul Halim Chowdhury
formed the United People ' s Party, which believed in establishing social
ism within the country.

Soon after factionalism started between Kazi

Zafar Ahmed and Captain Abdul Halim Chowdhury.

The United People ' s

Party led by Abdul Halim Chowdhury decided to j o in Jatiyota Badi Dal of
President Ziaur.

This created anger among Kazi Zafar and other leaders

of the UPP, which expelled Captain Halim and others who j oined the
Jatiyota Badi Dal;
Another faction from the NAP (Bhashani) was led by Dr . Aleem Al
Raj ee, who was the Vice-President of the NAP (Bhashan � ) .

He lost to

Moshiur Rahman in ascendency of power in the NA;p which led to the creat ion
of the Bangladesh People ' s League under the leadership of Dr. Aleem Al
Raj ee.
The NAP , headed by Mr. Mashiur Rahman, has decided to merge with
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party of Ziaur Rahman .

Still there was some

opposition from a group led by Anwar Zahid , who -- mo�ed a separate reso
lution opposing the decision of Mr. Mashiur Rahman , but he was supported
by only 29 out pf 1300 votes for Rahman .
The National Awami Party (Muzzaf far) led by Professor Muzzaf far
Ahmed, and the Bangladesh Connnunist Party led by Moni Singh, have the
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same ideological background , i . e . , establishment of the Soviet-type of
socialism.

During the reign of Sheikh Muzib they worked as a team of

the Awarni League showing constant signs of support for pro-Soviet
Indian policy.

6

This has been very much discredited by the people

because of their die-hard pro-Soviet policy.
The Jatiyo Samaj tartnik Dal (JSD} came into existence as a result
of antagonism between the Awami League because of its insistence on
Muzibism.

The JSD believe in the establishment of scientific socialism.

The JSD is led by Maj or (Rtd . ) Abdul Julil, a liberation hero and A. S . M .
Abdur Rab , a student leader, both o f whom were arrested by the present
regime for alleged creation of disturbance within the country.
"The JSD, which believes that the Bangladesh liberation war was
stopped just as it was about to become a real people ' s war, opposes the
nationalist leadership who it says represents only 8 percent of the people
but own 85 percent of the national wealth . "

7

I t considers itself to be

the supporting force of a correct proletarian organiz�tion, the Bangladesh
Communist League (BCL) .

I t is an underground party led by the former Stu-

dent League leader , Siraj ul Alam Khan .

He managed to get most of his

followers trained in guerrilla warfare during the independence war and has
since worked behind the scenes to bring about the splits in the Awami
League group that led to the formation of the JSD.

The BCL publishes a

daily newspaper, Gomokanta (Voice of the People) , which is edited by the
well-known radical poet, Al-Mahmud,

6
7

Th:e · Bangladesh Observer, August 1 3 , 1 9 7 8 .

TaJ.ukdaT Mariruzzaman, "Bangladesh:
Journal o f Asian Studies, August 1 9 7 5 .

An Unfinished Revolution , "
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The BCL, influenced by the Marxist ideas, analyzes the situation
in Bangladesh in terms of inherent contradiction s .

The BCL sees three

stages in the struggle for soc�alism of which the first two were achieved
by the end of the 1 9 7 1 liberation war .

Remaining, however, is the third

stage in which the contradiction between the ruling elite--the Awami
League--and other agents of imperialism and the proletariat , will be
resolved by a violent revolution.

Parliamentary politics is seen as a

means of perpetuating the rule of the exploiting classes, including
feudal elements , intermediaries, and the rising middle class.
The BCL hopes t hat at a certain stage, China will come to sympa
thize with ts revolution, but it resists following any communist inter
national line.

There is a friendly tenor in its attitude toward pro

Chinese Marxist-Lenist parties.

It is attempting to expand its member

ship and is supposed to have recruited most of the company commanders of
the Mukti Bahini and the district and sub-divisional commanders of the
Mukti Bahini.

The members are being formed into cel�s j o ined by an under

ground newspaper, Lal Ishtehar (Red Bulletin) .

The main leader , Siraj ui

Alam Khan, is also arrested now.
Another radical opposition party is the Bangladesh Communist Party
Leninbadi (the Communist Party of Bangladesh-Leninist--BCP (L) .

This party

originated with four of the five groups of pro-Chinese communists that
made up the Somonnoy (consultative) Committee formed in Calcutta during
the period of liberation:

( 1 ) the Coordination Committee of the Communist

Revolutionaries, ( 2 ) East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)
EPCP (M-L) , led by Amal Sen and Nazrul Islam, (3) some communists of Khulna
led by Drs. Marouf Hossain and Sayeddur Dahar, and (4) some communists led
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by Nasim Ali Khan.

The leaders of these groups thought that the exist

ence of so many communist parties in East Pakistan had prevented the left
from playing the leading role in the liberation of Bangladesh and they
issued a call for unification to complete their country ' s trancated
revolution.

In order to achieve this goal, they formed a new party

BCP (L) .
The BCP(L) adopted the strategy of working partly as an open
organization and partly as a secret party.

The open section of the party

is led by Amal Sen, Nazral Islam, Nasim Ali Khan and others.

The BCP (L)

has also formed a Student Front (Bangladesh Biplobi Chatra Union-Revolu
tionary Studen t s ' Union) and a Labor Front (the Bangla Sramik Federat ion
Bengal Labor Federation) and some of its members are working through the
National Awami Party .(Bhasani Group) and its peasant organization as wel l .
The names of the leaders of the underground sector of the party are not
known , but it is said to have established cells in three-fourths of Bangla
desh' s districts.
The ideology of the BCP(L) has much in �ommon with that of the BCL .
Both believe that the revolution in Bangladesh is unfinished because the
bourgeosie were able to assume leadership of the nationalist struggle, that
Russian communism is revisionist and Russia ' s intentions in Bangladesh is
imperialistic and that India is also a potential imperialist power .

"How

ever, the BCP (L} opposes violence such as that used by the Naxalites · in
8
India, whom i t considers anti-Leninist because they are so undisciplined . 11
The BCP(L) does not have a mass front such as the JSD and its student and
labor fronts are weak; so it does not have the appeal of the Communist
League.

8 Ibid . , p . 756.
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Despite the fact that the BCP (L) was formed in order t o unify
the left, it is experiencing conflict within its own ranks as well as
with those fa�tions of the Ea�t Bengal Communist Party and the East
Pakistan Communist Party that did not choose to unite with the other
groups in the first place.

Within the BCP (L) there is dissention

between those who chose to work within the National Awami Party (Bhas
hini) and its preasant organization and those who feel this is con
sorting with the enemy.

The conflict between the communists who work

in the NAP (B) and the non-communist members has also paralyzed the
working of that party.

In the council meeting of February , 1974 , the

two groups clashed and Bhashani was forced to postpone the session and
to dissolve the central committee.
The fifth group that had belonged to the original Somonnoy Com
mit tee, but did nbt join the BCL(L) was the East Bengal Communist Party
(Marxist-Leninist) led by Deven Sikdar and Abul Bashar.

For example , the

Sikdar-Bashar group saw the oppression of Bangladesh .By West Pakistan as
more direc t , the present position of India as �ore dominant within the
country and the Chinese Communist Party as more a political leader of
Bangladesh ' s struggles than did the BCP (L) members.

The Sikdar-Bashar

group , now called the Banglar Communist Party (communist party o f Benga l ,
BCP) also has an open and an underground section, a student front and a
labor fron t .

It regards participation in parliamentary parties a s a

strategy rather than a matter of basic principle.

The leadership of the

BCP comes from peasant and working class families and is without much
formal education.

This is in stark contrast to the BCP (L) leaders, who

are generally upper class and university educated.

It is these differ-
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ences in background and attitudes of leaders and cadres that differen
tiates the two parties, not their minor ideological incompatibilities.
The Bangladesh Commun�st League, the BCP(L) and the BCP have
adopted the tactics of working through both party cells and mass front
organizations.

However, there are four more revolutionary parties that

work only through their underground cells and underground armed fronts .
Of these two and factions of a group that j oined the Somonnoy Committee
--the East Pakistan Communist Party, one is a faction of the East Bengal
Communist Party from which Sikdar and Bashar split to form the BCP and
one is apparently quite separate in its origins from any of these.
The latter is the SarboharP. Party (Purba Bangla Sarbohar.a Party-
East Bengal Communist Party) which grew out of the East Bengal worker s '
Movement .

The leadership of the Sarbohara Party is generally university

educated, which may account for in part the fact that the party has been
the most prolific of all Bangladesh ' s revolutionary parties in publishing
party literature.

In addition to Lal Jhanda (Red Fl�g) and Sangbad Bulle

tin (news bulletin) , the party regularly publi�hes the proceedings of the
meetings of its central committee and numerous other pamphlets .
The Sarbohara Party agrees with the others that the Bangladesh
revolution was stopped too soon, with the Awami League serving as a puppet
government of Inida, which has plundered East Bengal and has maintained
its military presence there through arming, training and even clothing
the vigilante group--the Rakhi Bahini.
are also seen as threats.

Russian and American imperialism

They even claim that the nationalist revolution

has not yet been completed; the JSD is held to be making a Trotskyist error
in trying to complete the socialist revolution before the nationalist one.
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However, the bourgeois leadership of the Awami League cannot be truly
nationalistic, as they draw their support from imperialist powers and
semi-feudal countries ; only the' party of the proletariat can pursue the
revolution correctly.

In order to accomplish the revolution, the Sar

bohara Party has formed a National Liberation Front including peasants ,
workers and oppressed linguistic Biharis and members of the Chakma . and
Santal tribes.
Because Bangladesh is surrounded on three sides by India, the
Sarbohara theoreticians are concerned that no outside help will be avail-·
able for the revolution that the liberation front will have to depend on
its own resources .

It has launched a "liberation war'' procuring funds

and arms forcibly from pro-government. sources.
(Bhashani) is supporting it in this respect .

The National Awami Party
The party appears to have

recovered from its heavy losses of fighters to both the Pakistan army and
the lfo j ib Bahini, and it claims responsibility for most of the police
station lootings, bank robberies , and river dacoities.
libera tion.

perpetuated since

I t also claims to have taken the lives of several Awami

League workers, smuggler s , betrayers of party secrets and some Hindus who
were said to be still oppressing Muslims.

The geurrilla units lie low

during the winter and are most active during the rainy season, when govern
ment troops are at the greatest disadvantage.
The Communist Party of East Bengal (Marxist-Leninist) is another
underground revolutionary party, more commonly known as the Sammobadi Dal.
It is led by Mohammad Toaha and Sukhendu Dastidar, who brought about the
split in the original East Pakistan Communist Party in .1968 and formed its
pro-Peking wing.

Toaha collected a number of red geurrillas to fight both
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the Pakistan army and the Mukti Bahin i , but these were decimated by the
opposing forces and were unable to set up their projected People ' s Democratic Republic of Bangladesh.

After independence tneir newspaper,

Gono Shakti (People ' s Strength) , began to subscribe to the common theory
that Bangladesh had not really been liberated but was headed by a puppet
government responsible to India and thus indirectly to .Moscow .

Like the

Sarbohara Party, the Sammobadi Dal regards the Rakhi Bahini as essentially an Indian army in Bangladesh receiving arms· and ammunition from the
Indian government and taking direct aid from Indian armed forces to suppress rebels in the Chittagong Hill tracts and other areas in March 1 9 7 2 .
Also like the Sarbohara Party, the Sammonadi Dal has formed a national
liberation front under its direction and a guerrilla force recruited from
among frustrated freedom fighters.

Their main activities center in the

districts of Raj shahi, Pabna, Dacca, Mymensingh, Faridpur and Noakhali .
Some of the differences among the parties can be seen from the
ways in which they criticize each other.

"The Sammobadi Dal criticizes

the BCP(L) and the BCP for their stands on imperialism since the latter
two parties have supposedly given their support to the Awami League by
saying that it was dependent on India rather than terming it a ' puppet
government . ' "

9

The Sarbohara Party is dismissed as a mere terrorist group

misled by the upstart Sikdar into seeing the most important contradiction
as that between East Bengal and India rather than between socialist and
anti-socialist forces.

For this reason, the Sammobadi Dal thinks that the

Sarbohara Party might be acting as a counter-revolutionary terrorist force,

9 rbid . , p . 778.
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patronized by the U . S . in its attempt to oust Delhi and Moscow from
Bangladesh.

Similarly, the JSD, which is regarded as a mere falling

out over patronage among j uniqr AL member s , is thought to be supported
by India as a counterweight to keep Mujib ' s puppet government under
strict control.
While most of the members of the East Pakistan Communist Party
(Marxist-Leninist) formed the Sammobadi Dal under Toaha and Dastidar, a
small section under Abdul Hoq, retained the old name of the party and
separate organization.

a

This group is the most extreme in its interpre-

tation of the liberation struggle; it does not recognize the existence
of Bangladesh at a l l , preferring to see the war of independence as an
expansionist move by India and the country now as a colony of India.
The EPCP(M-L> has therefore launched its own people ' s war against the
counter-revolutionary forces to resurrect East Pakistan.

However , because

of its continued use of the name "East Pakistan" it has been the subject
of the s t rongest government action, and most ot the cadres have been
killed or jailed.

Abdul Hoq remains at large

•

.

The East Bengal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) EBCP (M-L) is
the last of the underground parties.

It is itself split into three groups ,

one of which, the group led by Sikdar and Bashar , joined the Sommony Com
mittee to form the BCL.

A second group led by Matin and Alauddin saw the

liberation struggle as a f ight between two "bourgeois dogs" and adopted
the line of ·killing and the class enemies from the Pakistan army through
feudal landlords to the Mukti Bahini.

lOrbid . , p . 782.

lO

This group then came under heavy
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attack by the Mukti Bahini after December 1 6 , 197 1 , and it fled from
Pabna to Attrai which was at that time under the control of Ohidur
Rahman .

He was persuaded to a�mit the error of supporting the Mukti

Bahini and his group was recruited to the EBCP(M-L) .

Their terrorist

activities led to reprisals by the government in a s eries o f hard
fought battles .

Both Motin and Ohidur Rahman were captured .

Alauddin,

who escap�d , is continuing publication o f Purbo Bangla (East Bengal) ,
the party ' s newspaper.
The EBCP(M-L) theoreticians ' .analysis of Bangladesh ' s political
situation is similar to that of the Sammobadi Dal, but the former put
more emphasis on the contradiction between peasants and feudal elements ,
claiming nationalism cannot b e achieved without a class struggle as wel l .
They also seek collaboration with the revolutionaries in India , especially
the Naxalites , who are distrusted by the other revolutionary parties of
Bangladesh .

The EBCP(M-L) is active in Attrai and in parts of Rajshahi,

Dinaj pur , Pabna and Kushtia districts .
The left revolutionary parties of Banglpdesh are agreed that the
war for independence left the revolution unfinished .
many differences among these parties.

There .ar.e. not so

Some differences of style and

emphasis can be traced to the class origins of the members and their
levels of education.

Most of the factionalism is due to the result of

personal animosities, desire for personal aggrandizemen t , accidents of
geography , of history , and the groups encounters with the Pakistan army
and Mukti Bahini.

They are not worried about the growth of so many

parties because they regard the s ituation as similar to Russia before
the October Revolution when there were s everal communist parties .

They
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feel that the party with the correct strategy will ultimately lead the
revolution.
There are so many par.ties in Bangladesh that· it threatens the
stability of the country.

None of the parties are well organized to

mobilize the people under one ideology.
gile.

The parties are generally fra

The main causes of too many parties are the personality conflict s ,

politics based on personality , too much influence on ideology .

If we

analyze the factionalism within the party, we find it is based on person
ality rather than ideology.

For example, Ataur Rahman and Sheikh Mujibar

Rahman could not tolerate each other .
formed a new party .

That is the reason why Ataur Rahman

The main difficulty with the personality-based party

is that if , in any way, that personality is lost , it loses the party.
There is a tendency in Bangladesh to recognize the party by leader rather
than by the party .

This tendency led to the coming up of many parties .

none of which are strong enough to form a maj ority.

Government is bound

to be formed by the coalition of different parties, .wbich starts rivalry
after assuming power .

This is what happened iµ Pakistan.

This was the

m ain reason for the failure of the parliamentary system in 1958 -nd the
coming of martial law .
In the June 3 election there was also a kind of coalition of parties
such as Gono Oikko Jote (Peopl e ' s Union) which was a coalition of the Awami
League, National Awami Party (Muzaffar) , Bangladesh Communist Party, Jatiyo
Janata Party.

The Gono Oikk.o Jote nominated General Osmani as the pi?esi

dential candidate.

Th- other coalition is the Jatiyatabadi Front (Nation

alist Front) composed of the Jatiyatabadi Gonotantrik Dal , the NAP (Bha
shani, the United Peopl e ' s Party� the Banglades� Labor Party, the Bangla-
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desh Muslim League, and the Bangladesh Tapshil Federation.
nominated Ziaur Rahman, who emerged victorious .

The coalition

He now faces the problem

of distributing patronage among the coalition member s ;

Moreover, it is

very difficult to integrate the diverse elements into a coherent policy,
because every party tries to maintain its separate identity .

Ziaur Rahman

very recently disbanded the coalition and is trying to organize the Jatiyatabadi Dal by encouraging others to merge with his own party .
Too much influence and insistence on ideology also creates factionalism within the party.

For example, scientific socialism and Mujibism

which led to the breaking up of the Awami League and the coming up of JSD.
There is no effective way within the party for the solution of conflicts.
There is no organized interest group to articulate the interests of the
people .

The parties have no organizational base in the rural areas where

the majority of the people live.
party politics .

The general people are unconcerned about

Only during election time do party leaders become active

for gaining popular support, which is completely base� on demogogu�ry . . Mos.t
of the groups are anomic groups who are utilized by the politicians for
satisfying their own desires .

Because of the poor aggregation of interest

of the people, the demands are unheard , which creates problems in the
input and output sector of the govenrment .
Following Duverger ' s classification of political parties , we may
present a typology of the political parties of Bangladesh in the following
table.

11

The politicaL.parties o f Bangladesh do not differ very much in

their organizational structure.

11

Minor differences with ideology leads to

M�urice Duverger , Political Parties (New York :
Sons , Inc . , 1955) , pp. 4-5.

John Wiley &

TABLE 1
_Q_f__ gladesh
Typology Qf Partl�_§___Ban
Party
Caucus

Organization
Branch-Cell

Articulation

Link
Horizontal
or Vertical

Centralized
or
Decentralized

Party Membership
Cadre, Mass or
Devotee

Mass
Centralized
Vertical
Branch
Weak
Awami League
NAP
Mass
Centralized
Vertical
Weak
Branch
(P ro-Russia)
NAP
Mass
Centralized
Weak
Vertical
Branch
(Bhashani)
Mass
Centralized
Vertical
Branch
Weak
Jatiyatabadi Dal
Mass
Centralized
Vertical
Branch
Weak.
Janata Party
Mass
Centralized
Horizontal
S trong
Branch & Cell
"JSD
Bangladesh
Communist
Mass
Centralized
League
Very Strong
Cell
Horizonfal
Bangladesh
Communist
Devotee
Centralized
Party (Leninist)
Horizontal
Cell & Branch
Very S trong
East Pakistan
Communist Party
(Marxist-Leninis t ) Cell
Devotee
Centralized
Very Strong
Horizontal
East Bengal
Devotee
Communist Party
Centralized
Cell & Branch
Horizontal
Very Strong
Bangaldesh
Devotee
Centralized
Communist Party
Horizontal
Very S t rong
Cell
Devotee
Centralized
Sammobadi Dal
Horizontal
Cell
Very S trong
East Bengal
Communist Party
Devotee
Centralized
Horizontal
(Marxist-Lenini�t) Cell
Very Strong
Banglar
Devotee
Centralized
Communist Party
Cell & Branch
Very Strong
Horizontal
Source : · Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc . , 1955) .
_

'°
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the growth of other partie s .

The moderate political parties like the

Awami Leagu e , NAP (Bhashani) , the Ja�ata Party , the Jatiyatabadi Dal ,
all work in branches and articulation is not very strong.

Their rela-

tionship with the other branches has a subordinate relationship to the
central party organization.
the center .

These parties are strictly controlled from

The policies come as hierarchical orders from the center.

All these parties appeal to the general mass for support .

The radical

parties like the JSD, Bangladesh Connnunist Party, and the East Bengal
Communist Party are organized into b ranch.es.,� and cells.

These radical

parties are strong in articulation, and have a horizontal relationship
with other branches because they give equal footing to their fellow
organizations · based on cells or branches .

Only the JSD comes closer to

the mass party because of its . appeal to· :the· populace as a whole.

All

other leftist parties like the Bangladesh Communist Leagu e , East Pakistan Communist Party(Marxist-Leninist) , Banglar Communist Party , Sammobadi
Dal , and the East Bengal Communist Party(Marxist-Leninist) are characterized by cells, strong articulation , horizontal relationship with their
supporting organizations , highly centralized and mem�ership is very closed
to the devotee party.
Analyzing the party system in Bangladesh, we may classify 1.t. in
the words of Duverger as "polypartism or the tendency to extreme multiplication of parties which can b e explained by general causes that are
rather variable.11

12

Many parties have emerged out of many reasons

although Bangladesh is a homogeneous entity.

The causes of the emergence

of many parties are factionalism, worship of personality, too many ideologies, etc.

i2·

Ibid . , p . 245 .

CHAPTER VI
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
The fundamental problem of political development is economic
development .

For a sound political system a sound economic system is

an urgent necessity.

Economic problems create frustrations among the

people leading to lnstability and disorganization within the system.
Problems of economic development are at the very root of politics.
The economic disparity bewteen East and West Pakistan is responsible for
the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh .

I f we

try to analyze the problems of stability , unity and integration, economic problems lie at the root o f many political problems .

The coup

of 1975 that killed Sheikh Muj ibar Rahman was due to the failure o f
Mujib t o solve the economic problems o f Bangladesh.
The economy of Bangladesh is completely undeveloped .

In the

post-liberation period she had to suffer the problem of reconstruction
A U . N . report estimated

o f the damages during the liberation struggle.

'�the cost of reconstruction in Bangladesh at $938 million.

Production in

all sectors of the economy declined sharply .

The jute industry output

was 28 percent less than 1969-70 production.

Exports were estimated to

be 30 percent less than normal requirements . 1 11

lJaast Faaland , and J . R . Parkinson, Bangladesh:
of Development ( Colorad o : Westview Pres s , 1976) , p . 46 .
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In the first two years after independence, war-ravaged Bangladesh
was able to avoid a major economic crisis and a large-scale famine mainly
because of the massive relief operations carried on by the United Nations
Relief Organization in Bangladesh (UNROB) in December 1 9 7 3 .
The nationalization o f industry was also a complete failure.
immediate result was chaos and confusion.

The

While the so-called abandoned

properties were placed under government-appointed administrators , who in
most cases turned out to be political nominees , the big blunder of the
government was to embark on the nationalization program without setting
up the institutional fr�mework to implement i t .

It has been criticized

by Badaruddin Umar as "to introduce nationalization without setting up
the institutional framework is a simple case of putting the cart before
the hors e . "

2

In most of the nationalized industries the adminis trators

appointed by the government were the AL workers who had no knowledge of
either a socialist or capitalist system.

The administrators grew rich

over night by smuggling machinery and raw materials .�o India.
Another important reason for the economic crisis was the large
scale smug5 l.ing of relief good s , foodstu�fs , and jute to India.

The

unequal real value between the Bangladesh taka and Indian rupee were
exchanged at par shortly after liberation; but officially it is equal
to 50 Indian ruppees .

The smugglers sell essential commodities to Indian

businessmen and in return bring cheap nonessential consumer goods worth
double the amount of Bangladesh taka .

"During the 1972-74 financial year

an estimated 1 . 5 million tons of paddy and 800,000 tons of rice were

2 s . M. Ali, After the Dark Past (New Delhi :
1973) .

Thompson Pres s , Ltd . ,
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reported smuggled to India . 11 3

While the economy of Bangladesh was on the

point o f collapse the s ituation was further aggravated by the worst flood
in July and August 1974 which, according to the estimate of the planning
commission, caused damage to "more than 1 million tons of food grains and
1 0 to 1 5 million dollars worth o f Jute exports .

The price of goods

4
increased by 700-800 percent compared to 1969-70 levels . "
The most important o f all these problems is the population problem.
I t is creating pressure on the land, resources , and the food suppl y .

With

the rise of population the unemployment is also increasing, causing frustrations . and leading to disgruntled elements in the population.

Frus trated,

these disgruntled people are j o ining the radical parties causing violence
and threatening the stability of the country .

The U . N . Bulletin of

Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. Vil, No . 2 , June 1 9 7 7 , gave the
following projection of the population in Bangladesh, Pakistan, · India and
Sr . Lanka .

(See Table 2 , following page . )

I n Bangladesh 7 babies are born every minute, . 3 . 7 million every
year; about 1 . 3 3 million die yearly , thus , 2 . 3 7 million people are being
added to the total population.

The birth rate is 47 per 1000 per year .

Therefore, the rate of increase is 30 per 1000 or 3 percent and at the
rate of natural increase i t will take only 23 years to reach 156 million
from the present number .

5

In India, the birth rate is probably about 40

3Talukdar Maniruzzaman , ''Bangladesh in 1 9 7 5 : The Fall of Mujib
Regime and Its Aftermath , " Asian Survey, February, 1 9 7 6 .
4
Jaast Faaland , and J . R. Parkinson, .££.· c it . , p . 7 9 .

5
Md . Shah Jahan, "Population Boom and Food Production , " The Bangladesh Observer, September 1 7 , 1 9 7 8 .

TABLE 2
Population Growth in Bangaldesh and Neighboring Countries
Latest Census Estimate of Midyear PoEulation (millions)

Country

Area
Square
Kilometers

Date

Bangladesh

142 , 998

1 / 3 / 74

India

3 , 2 8 7 , 782

1/4/71

796, 095

6 / 9 / 72

6 5 , 309, 340

9 / 1 0/ 7 1

1 2 , 7 1 1 , 143

Pakistan
Sri Lanka

6 5 , 6 10

Population

7 1 , 479' 071

1937

1963

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

----

53.21

69. 77

7 1 .47

73.21

7 4 . 99

7 6 . 82

78 . 66

462 . 03

551 . 07

562 . 9 1

5 74 . 8 1

596 . 66

45.47

6 2 . 43

64 . 30

66 . 23

68.21

70 . 2 1

7 2 . 37

10.65

12.61

1 2 . 86

1 3 . 10

1 3 . 28

13.51

13.73

548 , 1 5 9 , 652 303 . 63
----

S.73

598 . 4 3 6 1 0 . 08

Source: Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics for Asia and the Pacific, Vol. VI , No . 4 , December
1 9 7 6 (New York: United Nations) , p . 2 0 .

......

0
0
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and the death rate was thought t o b e 1 6 ; over 1 2 million people were
The

added to the Indian population each year between 1965 and 1970 .

growth rate in Pakistan averaged 2 . 5 percent per year during 1965-1970 . 6
Though the above mentioned countries are overpopulated, Bangladesh exceeds
all the neighboring countries in population growth.
With over 4 5 percent of the population under the age of 1 5 , a
nearly 3 percent rate of natural increase and a dependency burden not
far from unity, the result is an indisputable burden of absolute numbers
combined with virtually unaltered and enormous potential for further
growth.

"Population density in Bangladesh ' s 55 , 000 square miles of ter:..

rain would b e 2 . 841 persons per square mil e . "

7

Th.e rapid rise of the population is due to the early marriage in
Bangladesh.

Nearly 50 percent of the women in the age group between 1 2

and 14 are married and about 90 percent of those aged 1 5 to 1 9 .
planning is insufficient .
contro l .

8

Family

In the villages , people are opposed to birth

The lack o f education stands in the way o f proper implementation

o f family planning .
planning.

Religion may b e an obstacle to the adoption of family

Hafez Zaidi, in his study, emphasized the importance of super-

stition as well as religious teaching and concludes that 99 percent of the
Muslims and 98 percent of the Hindus believe that man has no control over
the means of livelihood .

9

It is assigned by God.

What is written in his

forehead wd.11 determine his destiny.

6

c . Stephen Baldwin, "Catastrophe in Bangladesh : An Examination of
Alternative Population Growth Possibilities 197 5-2000 , " Asian Survey,
February, 1977 .
7Jaast Faaland and J . R . Parkinson , �· cit . , p . 84.
8

rbid . , p . 85.

9 rbid. , p . 87 .
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Due to the rise o f population, Bangladesh has become a food deficit area.

Agriculture is the mainstay o f economic life in Bangladesh.
"As much as 90 percent of the total population
live in rural areas .

Over 80 percent o f all

employment is in agriculture ; about 60 percent
of the national product is derived from agri
culture ; 90 percent o f national exports are
either agricultural or manufacturers of them.
As land area cannot be expanded its use must
be optimized .

Expansion of new human settle

ment is forcing Bangladesh to lose about 28
percent of her 2 . 5 milliom acres of cultiv
able land every decade worsening the chronic
food probl:em . 11 1 0
The increasing population i s creating a constant food problem. ·
According to an estimate,
tons in 1961 to

"food production has increased from 9 . 4 million

1 cro�e 30 lakh tons in 1976 but per capita food avail

ability has dropped from 1 6 . 5 ounces to 1 4 ounces per person per day . 11

11

This is because the growth rate of population has outpaced the production
This food problem is the most dominant problem of politics and

of food.
economics .

The main issue in Bangladesh politics is food.

The success of

a government depends on how effectively it can feed the people without any
hunger .
The increasing population is also creating widespread unemployment
leading to dysfunctional elements in the political system.

Being unemployed

these people have nothing to do but resort to sabotage and disorder.

That

is the main reason for the rise of radical political parties which take
advantage o f these d isgruntled elements .

It is likely that with the pre-

sent rate o f increase o f population, there will be 8 to 20 million unemployment by the end o f the century .

lO
11

ibid . , p . 93 .
Ibid . ' p . 9 5 .

Bangladesh has 30 percent unemployment
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which is a constant threat to political and social stability.

By 2000,

with 30 percent of the population unemployed , there will be great danger .

12

The urban migration is also creating the problem of socio-political
stability.

While the bulk of the Bengali population is in rural areas ,

there is a persistent trend towards urbanization and more recently this
phenomenon has accelerated .

A National Quarterly sample survey conducted

by the central statistical office o f the erstwhile government o f Pakistan
in 1967-68 revealed that 5 . 97 percent of the total urban Bengalese popula
tion of age 1 0 years and above had migrated within the preceeding year . 1 3
Information o n the reasons which motivated such rural to urban
migration was:.collected :by this survey.
TABLE 3
Reasons Given by Rural Population Who Migrated
to the Urban Areas : 1967-68
Reasons for Rural-Urban
Proportion of Total Migrants
of
Age : IO and . Above
Migration
3 9 . 37
To seek job
To set up industry
4 . 07
or business
0 .9 0
To study
10.41
To marry
45 . 25
Others
Source: Iftikhar Ahmed , "Employment in Bangladesh: Problems and
Prospect s , " in A . G . Robinson, and K . Griffin, The Economic Development
of Bangladesh Within a Socialist Framework (New York : John Wiley & Sons ,
1974 , p . 252 .
I t is clear from the survey that in Bangladesh almost two-fifths o f the
total migrants o f age 1 0 and above who migrated into the urban areas were

12
13

rbid . ' p . 98 .

lftikhar Ahmed , "Employment in Bangladesh , " in Economic Development of Bangladesh, p . 7 9 .
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looking for work.
lence or extrem.ism .

These migrants are readily persuaded to political vioThey are very much attracted by the radical parties

to create disturbance within the coun�ry.

14

Another problem which threatens the security of Bangladesh is
The development plan is very much

widespread corruption in every sector.
hampered by this kind of
utilized.

corruption.

Whatever money is allocated is not

More than half of the money is wasted on undue bribes .

is widespread hierarchy and red tapism within the administration.
gives the officials a chance to take bribes .
corrup t .

There
This

The politicians are also

Corruption may alienate modarn""Oriented civil servants and cause

them to leave the country or withdraw or reduce their efforts .

In addi-

tion to the obvious costs, this may involve considerable opportunity costs
in the form of restriction of governmental programs because of fears that
a new program might be ineffective in practice.
Industrialization is backward .

The industrial production contri-

buted only 8 percent to the gross domestic product .

The government has

established certain projects that are inadequately prepared a�d vested ,
sometimes through political involvement by overstaff ing of unskilled labor
and sometimes using traditional administrative services in the management
In general, Bangladesh has experienced great difficulty in raising

proces s .

resources to cover current budgetary expenditures and to provide for that
part of the small development programs .
"The budget of 1975-76 was the first to show
a comfortable surplus on the current account .
This surplus amounts to only $100 million at

14

Ibid . , p . 80 .

1 05
the current exchange rate. But this money is
quite insufficient for long-term development
programs . 11 15
All these problems cannot be solved unless the basic problem of
establishing a stable government is solved.

The first task is to carry

out the difficult and painstaking task of improving the machinery of
administration, training people to operate i t , and giving incentive , hope
and leadership needed to do this .
be presented.

The following development scenatio · can

(See Table 4 , following page . )

The economic condition of Bangladesh improved significantly in
197 5.:from the totally dismal pie ture that had prevailed in 197 4 .
"By January 1975 the price of rice had risen by
500 percent over the 1969-70 level . By July the
price came down by 300 percent . From July to
September the price of rice fell by another 37
percent and the cost of living index fell by 9
percen t . During the same period the money supply
declined b y 3 . 5 percent and bank deposits by 5 . 6
6
percent .11 1
The military regime under the leadership of General Zia has been
particularly successful in the economic field.

The government discarded

the socialist pretensions of the Mujib regime and took special measures
to boost private foreign trade and private investment in the industrial
sector.

Private foreign and indigenous traders entered into the formerly

nationalized jute trade.

Some of the nationalized industries were given

over to the private entrepreneurs.

A ceiling of Taka 20 million fixed by

the Mujib government for private investment was raised to Ta�a 100 million.

15Jaast Faaland , and J . R. Parkinson, �· cit . , p . 9 3 .
16
Montgomery and Siffins , Approaches to Politics, Development and
Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Co . , 1967) , p . 20 .

TABLE 4
Development Scenario 1 9 7 5-2000

A.

Population and Major Accounts Magnitudes

Population (millions)
Gross Domestic Product (millions)
Gross Investment (millions)
Net Capital Import (millions)
Domestic Savings Per Capita
Consumption (millions)
Gross Product Per Capita (millions)
Consumption Per Capita (millions)
Domestic Savings Per Capita (millions)
Gross Investment Per Capita GDP
Capital Import Percent o f GDP
Domestic Savings Percent o f GDP

B.

Annual Growth Rates and
25-Year Growth Index

Population
Gross Domestic Product
Gross Investment
Gross Product Per Capita
Consumption Per Capita
C.

1 975/80

1980/85

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

80
6400
550
800
250
6650
80
83
-3
8
12
-4

93
8170
1225
980
245
7925
88
85
3
15
12
3

106
10930
1965
1310
655
10275
103
97
6
18
12
6

121
14630
2635
1465
1 1 70
13460
121
111
10
18
10
8

136
19610
3530
1570
1960
17650
145
130
15
18
8
10

150
26140
4710
1570
3140
2300
1 74
153
21
18
6
12

1985/90

1990/95

1995/2000

1980/2000

Total
Growth
Index
1975/2000

3.0
5.0
17.4
2.0
0.6

2.8
6.0
10.0
3.1
2.5

2.6
. 60
6.0
3.3
2.9

2.3
6.0
6.0
3.6
3.2

2.0
6.0
6.0
3.8
3.3

2.4
6.0
7.0
3.5
3.0

187
401
855
218
184

(2 . 0)

2.7

3.0

3.0

3.0

3.0

n.a.

(28)

15

14

16

14

16

n.a.

(62)

32

24

20

22

21

n.a.

Selected Ratios

Capital-Output Ratio
Marginal Overall Savings
Rate (percent)
Marginal Per Capita
Savings Rate

Source: Jaast Faaland , and J . R . Parkinson , Bangladesh :
Westview, 1976) .
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To attract foreign investment, the government announced the policy of
non-nationalization and tax holiday for all new induntrien and home
remittance of net profits by foreign companies.

The effect of these

policies has been a marked improvement in the private sector.

"As

against the total investment of Taka 200 . 9 million in the two financial
years of 1973-74 and 1974-75, there was a total private investment of
Taka 850 . 9 million in the financial year 1975-76 . "

17

The government launched a massive program of manual digging and
creation of canals and the building of roads and embankments under a
work for food program.

By November 1 9 7 6 , 2 , 200 miles of embankment and

900 miles of road had been constructed and 2 , 200 miles o f new canals
excavated.

Lastly, the government appointed 1 2 , 000 family planning

officers thoughout the. country to popularize the family planning pro
gram.

The government has also been successful in checking smuggling

across the border.

The cumulative effect of the government policies

has resulted in a marked improvement in all fields of the Bangaldesh
economy .

"Both the annual reports of the Bangladesh Bank and the World

Bank, 1975- 7 6 , revealed that gross domestic product rose by 1 1 . 4 percent
in 1975-76, as against 2 percent the preceeding year.

The overall cost

of living index was estimated to have declined by 20 percent during the
year as a against a rise of 3 1 percent during 1974-75.

Industrial output

increased by 5 percent and for the first time since liberation, the pro
duction of the all important jute industry went up by 7 . 3 percent .

The

export target fixed at Taka 5540 million in 1975-76 was exceeded by Taka

17

rhe Bangladesh Observer , September 26 , 1 9 7 8 .
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560 million.

The improving trends in the economy showed acceleration

in the first quarter of the financial year 1976- 7 7 , particularly in the
export sector, which increased by 48 percent over the corresponding
period in 1975-76 . " 1 8
The economy does not look so good compared to 1 9 7 6 .

A growth

rate of 3 percent is estimated for the year compared to 9 . 7 percent during the previous year .

The decline in the growth rate has been attributed

to the short fall in the agricultural sector.

Food grains production in

1977 was estimated to be short by about one million tons from the target
of 43 million tons.

Excessive rain and f loods caused this decline.

The

industrial output increased because of a higher production of sugar ,
fertilizer, cement , paper, and other product s .
"The hig�light o f the 1977-78 budget could be summarized as follows :
(a) total revenue income Taka 1 1 , 560 million (official exchange rate is
approximately $ 1

=

Taka 1 5 . 50) ;

(b) total expenditure Taka 20, 960 million

on development and Taka 400 million for food and work programs; (c) an
anticipated growth rate of 7 percen t ; (d) agricultural sector projected
to grow by 8 percent, industrial sector by 7 percent and other by 9 percent.

The investment climate in the private sector looks favorable for

the first time since 1972 as the government went ahead with its policy of
encouraging entrepreneurs, both at home and abroad .

There was no indica-

tion of further nationalization and the National Investmet Board opened

18Philip

M. Hauser, "Some Cultural and Personal Characteristics
of the Less Developed Areas , " in Finkle and Gable (eds . ) , Political
Development and Social Change (New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc . , 1968) ,
p. 56.
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new industrial units for private investment .

About 200 smaller indus-

tries were denationalized by the government and returned to the private
sector. 11

19

Although Bangladesh is far from achieving self-suf ficiency in
food there are indications of serious efforts to achieve this goal.
Rural development received top priority in 1 9 7 7 and substantial international aid was promised to increase agriculturpl productivity.

The

program of Swanirvar (self-sufficiency) was launched in selected areas
to improve agriculture through voluntary labor offered by the villagers.
Zia was impressed by the showpiece of this program at Ulashi in Jes�
sore district and urged the villagers to follow the spirit of development through self-reliance throughout the country .
Related to economic problems are the social problems .
problems are to politics and economics .

Social

As Regen mention s , "politi.c.al

development also means the change of traditional values .

In exploring

the possibilities for a framework for analyzing economic and political
development , Regen takes account of deep-seated resistance to social
change and of the need for changing some rather basic attitudes if
development is to succeed. 11 20
The main problem in Bangladesh is mass illiteracy.

The literacy

rate in the country was up by 4 . 4 percent in 1974 compared to that in
1 96 1 .

The literacy rate now stands at 24 . 3 percent .

The urban literacy

1 9 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1 9 7 6 : Struggle for Sur
vival as an Independent State," Asian Survey, VII , February 1 9 7 7 .
20
Montgomery and Siffins, Approaches to Politics, Development
and Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Co . , 1967 ) , p . 2 3 .
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rate o f 4 4 . 0 percent i s almost double than that o f rural areas .

. Males

have a higher literacy rate than females which stands at 32 . 9 percent
and 1 4 . 3 percent, respectively.

Due to the lack of education people

are not socialized to national goals and ideology.

They are not

invovled in the national political culture.
In the developing societies the Bangladesh political sphere is
not sharply differentiated from the spheres of social and personal rela
tions.

Among the most powerful influences of the traditional order in

any society in transition i s the survival of a pattern of politcal rela
tionship largely determined by the pattern of social and personal rela
t ions with the inevitable result that the political struggle tends to
revolve around issues of prestige, influence and even of personalities
and not around questions of alternative courses of policy action.
The elite who dominate the national politics of most non-Western
countries generally represents a remarkably homogeneous group in terms of
educational experience and social background .
At the village level it is even more difficult to distinguish a
distinct political sphere.

The social status of the individual and his

personality largely determines his political behavior a�d the range of
his influence, a condition which places severe limits on the effective
ness of anyone.:who came from thet6utside to perform a political role , be it
that of an administrative agent of the national government or of a repre
sentative of a national party.

Political discussion tends rather to assume

the form of either intracommunal debate or the attempt of one group to
justify its position toward another .
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The lack of a clearly differentiated political sphere means that
political parties tend to be clearly oriented not to a distinct political
arena but to some aspect of the communal framework of politics.

In reflect

ing the communal base of politics they tend to represent total ways of
life; attempts to organize parties in terms of particular political prin
ciples or limited policy objectives generally result either in failure or
in the adoption of a broad ethic which soon obscures the initial objective.
Usually political parties represent some sub-society or simply the person
ality of a particularly influential individual.
Despite the impact of colonization and the presence of a united
veneer of Western technology and culture, the mass population have in the
main retained their traditional values .

The ingredients of the value sys

tem are in apparent conflict with the new national aspirations for econ
omic advancement .

For example, some o f the cultural elements which appear

to be in conflict with technological development and the attainment of
higher levels of living are:

the emphasis on spiritual rather than mate

rial values ; the stress laid on the importance of afterlife or future
existence; the pressure for conformance with an oftern intolerance with
deviations from traditional patterns of thought and action, the relatively
rigid definitions of roles of members of the family, the village and the
social order at large, the parochialism of the diverse radical, ethnic ,
linguistic and territorial group s , the familistic orientation, the tend
ency to place savings in traditional channels of investments , including
non-productive investments like j ewels and precious stones and the allo
cation of relatively large amounts of life-space and energy to traditional
cultural and religious rituals, ceremonies and festival s .

1 12

The traditional value systems do not provide the population
with incentive for material gain or expectations of advancement based
on merit and application.

The prestige vocations and occupations t end

to be those in government , religion , and agriculture, not the type of
occupations identified with economic development .

That i s , occupations

in commerce, industry and many of the professions and the services have
yet to achieve prestige and attract competent people.

Moreover, the

traditional value systems do not provide the person with general orien
tation of the type necessary in a monetary as distinguished from a sub
sistence economy , including conceptions of work as a segmente.P area of
activity requiring a fixed time , place, and an employer-employee nexu s .
Very rigid stratification exists in the society.

It undoubtedly

has an adverse effect on individual incentive conducive to economic
It tends to restrict the access of persons with ability to

advance.

education, training and opportunity consonant with effective utilization
of human resources.

There is a widespread tendency to restrict education,

technical training, and the better vocational opportunities to members of
the elite.

In consequenc e , such limited opportunities as exist for train

ing, both domestically and abroad , through various scholarship s , fellow
ships and technical assistance programs are of ten made available on a
nepotistic, familial, village, ethnic, religious or personal basis rather
than strictly on merit .
There is a tendency to place a great premium on age.
is often a maj or · basis for status and prestige.

Seniority

The older person is

regarded as a repository of the experience and knowledge of society and
is treated with the utmost respect and deference.

The privileges and
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priorities of seniority are in the main rigidly fixed and rarely
impaired.

This is particularly in evidence in those nations in which

a government civil service has been established .
wait his turn for advancement.

A younger man must

Greater competence on his part or

incompetence on the part of a senior officer is rarely an adequate
basis for the replacement of an older by a younger person.

As a resul t ,

the scarcity o f skilled human resources t o which reference has been made
above is of ten made even more acute by the inability of the culture to
tilize such skills as are available.
"Among the mass population ' s adherence to ancient tradition and
superstitious ways of ten directly interfers with economic advancement., wide
spread beliefs, fears, inhibitions and behaviorisms generated by living
in a universe deemed to be controlled by astrological , numerological and
economic advance and a general orientation prepared to accept the method
1
ology and fruits of science l These socio-economic problems create prob
lems in the execution of any new policy which is a very important part of
political development .
Bangladesh, as a society, fits within the trasitional stage; the
societal structure is not purely traditonal or modern .
process is not very modernized.
tutions play a great par t .
than achievement .

The socialization

Still the family and other inner insti

Political roles are based on ascription rather

The political leaders are j udged on the basis of their

family background rather than on achievement.
general welfare activities.

They devote much time ln useless discussion

rather than constructive work.
rather than organized.

People are apathetic to

The conununication process is face to face

Bad conununication systems alienate people from the

2 1 Philip M. Hauser, ££.· cit .
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decision-making process.
value s .

People are still attracted to the tradit ional

For example, obedience to religion, t o seniors and aristocrats,

more values to men than women .
institutions.
in Bangladesh.

They worship personality rather than

All the characters of the transitional society are existing
As a result of these, any developmental plan faces resist

ence from the society.
The values are changing very fast in the cities.
villages, the changes are very slow.

It creates problems because the

majority of the population lives in the villages.
often misunderstood by the populace .

But in the

The elites values are

For instance, the theory of secular

ism advocated by Sheikh Muj ib was misinterpreted by the people who inter
preted secularism as no religion.

As 80 percent of the population are

Muslims, they could not appreciate secularism as an ideology .

They

regarded it as an opposition to Islam and a blow to the tradition of
I slamic philosophy.
But the problem lies with the lack of connnu nication.

The new

values can be implanted in the minds of the people by better communication
media.

CONCLUSION
As has been mentioned in the introductory chapter political
development is a very comprehensive concept .
in application its problems are also many .

Since it is very broad
The preceding chapter ana

lyzes the problems o f political development in Bangladesh.

An analysis

of the preceding chapter will show that Bangladesh is still facing the
problem o f integration.

The regional disparity between the north and

south.. has compelled the government to take certain steps for the satis
faction of the needs of · the northern people .
much regionalized.

The

Politics is becoming very

tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are

demanding provincial autonomy in their area.

They are also demanding

the preservation of their own culture and values .

Bad communication sys

tems have alienated the tribal people from the rest of the population.
Following the definition of Myron Weiner , Bangladesh is still facing the
problem with regard to elite-mass integration, value integration.
is a wide gap between the elites and the mass .

There

As such1 there is a gap

between the input and output sector o f the political system.

The mass

cannot communicate their demands to the elites who are also unable to edu
cate the people in policy implementation.

In matters of national ideology ,

Bangladesh is still in search of one which can unify the people.

The indi

cation of these problems rightly establishes the hypothesis that there is
the problem of national integration in Bangladesh.
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The precarious problem which Bangladesh is facing is the problem
of stability and unity.

As Chapter III shows , soon after the creation of

Bangladesh, there was complete disorder and instability.

Inter-group and

intra-group conflicts characterize the political situation.
years different types of government came into being.
of the form of government .

Within a few

People are not sure

The existing government is also facing the

problem of establishing legitimate authority.

The rising expectations

caused rising frustrations creating instability.

The recalcitrant groups

are busy in creating turmoil within the country .

The radical parties

resort to violence rather than finding any constitutional channel for the
solution o f the problem.
by different group s .

The government is frequently shaken by revolts

All these pictures come very close to our hypothesis

that the problem of political development in Bangladesh is hindered by the
problem of stability and unity.
Chapter V .· · shows that Bangladesh is characterized by many politi
cal parties , none of which are organized to attract a large following .
parties lack organization at the grass roots level .
based on the personality of a single leader.
beh.ind the parties .

The

The party structure is

There is no coherent ideology

Even within the parties, factional conflicts threaten

the very stability of the country .

The radical parties are engaged in

underground .. politics indulging in sabotage and disorder.
healthy growth of any political institutions .
party also stands in the way of national unity .

This hampers the

The lack of a well-organized
People are factionalized

on the basis of party .
Chapter IV establish.es the problem of the bureaucracy in Bangla
desh.

It inherited the system of the British administration, which trained
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the bureaucracy in the art of control rather than direction o f policy
initiatives .

This tradit ion of the bureaucracy hampered the growth of

the formal political institutions .

After the liberation the negative

role o f the bureaucracy also created a problem because the bureaucracy
lacked the initiative in administration.

This created a problem in

adminis tration which was needed very badly in a new-born state.
a balance in the role of the bureaucracy is a serious prob l em .
in any way creates problems .

Upperhand

After the eomiµg of Ziaur Rahman, the bureau

cracy again gained the upperhand .
the political institutions .

To make

It has created problems in t�e growth of

As such, we see the essay rightly confirms the

view that the problem of making a balance in the role of the bureaucracy
does exis t .
The most dominant problem is the socio-economic probl em .

The

problem o f population, unemployment and low productivity creates growing
frustration among the peopl e .

In the preceding chapters we see the main

cause of the prevailing instability is the failure o f the government to
solve the economic problems like population , increase in the price index,
etc.

The essay clearly states population and other socio-economic problems

lie at the root of all political problems .

The traditional values and way

of life are also ingrained in the people who obstruct the peaceful way of
change o f modernization.

An analysis of the socio-economic problems of

Bangladesh rightly establishes our hypothesis that the most precarious
problem which hinders political development is the problem of economic
devel opment .
Analyzing different problems we find that Bangladesh is seriously
facing the problem of political development .

Of cour s e ,

these problems
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are not peculiar only i n Bangladesh .
suffering from these problems .
which is a new-born country.

All the developing countries are

The problem is very acute in Bangladesh,
Bangladesh is itself the · creation of the

problem of integration which creates problems in the developing countries .
The birth o f Bangladesh has created a kind o f separatist tendency among
the disgruntled elements .

Politics have become regionalized .

The tribal

people of Chittagong Hill Tracts , taking account of their underdevelopment
compared to other parts of the country , are demanding provincial autonomy
for themselves citing the example o f Sheikh Mujib who demanded provincial
autonomy for the then East Pakistan on the basis of a six-point formula .
The tribal people also try t o base their demands b y citing the separate
culture and traditions of the people .

I f the government does not take

effective steps for the satisfaction o f their problems , one day i t may
lead to further problems threatening the security of the country .

The

main problem is due to the lack of communication between the tribal people
and the other people .

Because o f the bad communication system they cannot

come into contact with the rest o f the population.
aged to participate in national politics.

They should be encour

Because o f the lack of partici

pation their demands remain unheard and unredressed.
Though solutions are very d i f f icult we can suggest some policy
recommendations by giving due attention to the problems .

As the majority

of the people l ive in the villages , steps should be taken for integrated
rural development .

Unemployment in the villages , whether partial , seasonal

or disguised , is widespread and efforts to uplift the rural areas by finding
more employment for the people should get top priority.

The cultivation of

land has almost reached the saturation point in most parts of the country
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and while the increasing of productivity is rightly get d.ng full at tention, the scope of employment in agriculture is limited .
Ways and means , therefore, have to be evolved· to absorb the surplus manpower in the villages in gainful subsidiary occupations .

The pre-

sent government has laid emphasis on creating more employment opportunities
and exercises are presently going on to explore all possible avenues to
ahcieve this end .
requires

a

Augmentation of employment potential in the rural sector

multi�pr.qnged approach.

"The strategy of the government for the purpose includes the
setting up of small-scale industries all over the rural areas on a massive
scale which will , of course , require huge investment and a gigantic train
ing program . 11 1

For this , involvement of institutions like parks and indus-

trial houses , is of prime necessity .

In addition, cottage industries and

village hand icrafts are also to be encouraged in every way and markets should
be explored for them .
Rural employment is an important issue which calls for urgent attention not only of the development planners but of all governments throughout
the world , particularly in the developing countries .

The present government

has assigned top priority to the program of rural development.

According to

the goals defined , every able-bodied person should be provided with gainful
employment within the next few years .
task.

It is undoubtedly the most challenging

Its fulfillment would naturally call for all out efforts on the part

of all segments of our society.

1
Mumtaz Khanam, "Integrated Rural Development , " The Bangladesh
Observer , August 1 4 , 1 9 7 8 .
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The most fundamental problem is illiteracy, which is blocking
the smooth running of the country .
problems .

Education lies at the root of all

·

Instability, disunity, factionalism, and lack of an organized

party all are beset with the problem of illiteracy.
urgent necessity.

Education is an

It is necessary for implanting values, tolerance and

national political cultures .

Unless people are educated to national poli-

tical ideology and political culture of the country no attempt at political
stabilization, economic development or unity will be successful . .
Bangladesh needs to undertake ambitious plans and programs for
attaining self-reliance in every stage of her economy as early as possible.
The undertaking and execution of development plans and programs needs the
development of the executive skills .

The success of any program depends

on the successful performance of the executives .

Such executive skill

should be developed , but this does not mean that this development of skill
will supercede other development of the nation.

The development strategies

of executive skills should be well. assessed to give room to every eligible
one for the nation-building task.

Abdur Rashid Khan in his article, Develop-

ment Strategies for Executive Skills , gave certain suggestions :
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.

He should be imbided with the spirit of
nationalism and be dispirited with the
feelings of self-interest .
His thought and expression in national
interest should be well-evaluated to get
9ptimum service from him.
His expertise in the respective field of
work should be well renumerated for maximum ·
utilization.
He should be given incentives for his higher
efficiency and productivity in performance .
He should be encouraged for his constructive
thinking and expression in national interes t .

1 21

6.

7.

8.
9.

He should be given room to pass any con
structive comment for improvement of any
policy which he is to implement , if there
is any hinderance in the course of execution.
His power of motivation in getting the work
done by others properly should be accounted
for to his credit .
There should be a spirit of fair competition
in developing executive skills .
He should be affixed with a definite respons
ibility to make him more cautious and responsible
2
to the nation.

But there should be checks and balances in the growth of the executive skills which may j eopardize other development works .
For rural development , the most urgent necessity is the development
of the local government.

Local bodies should be given more power because

it is the true representative of the people.

The representatives of the

local bodies are very much attached to local nP.ed s .
bureaucratic dominance of administration.

This will lessen the

�ery recently , President Ziaur

Rahman reiterated,
"The government ' s firm det- ermination to decentral
ize administrative machinery and delegate more power
to the local government for a rapid and unhindered
economic developmen t . He also emphasized the greater
role for the Thana Committee and Union Parishad
(council) . "3
There is also the need f6r the reorganization of the Thana administration which should be based on the peoples ' representatives .

The local

officials know better about the needs and demands of the local people and
there is another psychological reason that the local officials will have a
profound and si.ncere desire to develop his own area and as a common conse-

2
Abdur Rashid Khan, "Development Strategies for Executive Skills , "
The Bangladesh Observer , Sept-ember 1 9 , 1 9 7 8 .
3The Bangladesh Observer , September 1 , 1 9 7 8 .
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quence of it he will work for the local people more and more effectively
and wholeheartedly .

It is also supposed that the local officials will be

able to motivate and mobilize the local people more effectively and ef fi
ciently.

The biggest reason for which this attempt of the government

deserves our praise is that there are many more channels of more and more
efficient and effective administration if the local officials work in close
collaboration with the local representatives and local people.

Because the

complete administration at the Thana level will be conducted by the local
people, the Thana administration will be able to work as a self-government
which will add a stupendous and glorious chapter in the history of local
self-government in Bangladesh.

In order to establish the Thana administra

tion as a local self-government unit we are in great need of reorganizing
the Thana ·Council s .
Very recently the government has declared another plan t o form a
Thana Development Committee in every Thana from the next financial year .
For the proper development in every sphere of life well-planned and well
organized activities are essentially needed.

The people have to be mobil

ized so that the.y can spontaneously take part in the development activities
and in an organized way; the manpower should be utilized so that the best
possible achievement can be made to accomplish these objectives .

To esta

blish the Thana Development Committee we should first of all abolish the
existing Thana Council and a Thana Development Committee should be formed
in its place by taking peoples ' representatives who would be elected dir
ectly by the people.

In this way people are encouraged to participate in

national politics .
There is also the need of proper village leadership.

Without

leadership no organized goal s , functions or aims can be achieved.

Strong
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well-organized and well-knitted leadership will ensure fruitful and farreaching result s .

I f leadership becomes weak, flexible and oscillating

total · expectations of the desired goals might be frustrated .

As develping

the nation ' s economy is based on agricultur e , leadership in the village
areas is the prime concern for all.

Because leadership in the village

areas means strong guidance in the field of agricultur e , husbandry, cottage industry, etc. that ultimately increases GNP and thus standardize
national life both internally and externally.
If we look at the villages of Bangladesh, we find leadership in
village areas primarily originates from the following sources :
Mohajans , (2) Matbai:s .,.:··:.(3)1·.?.J:ra�itional families (middle class) .

( 1 ) Village
Of them,

village Mohaj ans and Matbars are permanent village dwellers who merely know
the problems of the village but most of whom have no educational qualification and hence their understanding the conception of democracy, cooperatives ,
etc . , are very primary.

4

They capture village leadership due to their .

increasing influence on poor peasant s , handicraftsmen, fishermen and others
because they hold vast land , a large sum of money and capital.

By their

power and wealth, they can easily motivate the poor people at their own
interests.

Further , it is found that allegiance to Mohajans and Matbars

is created through generatio� after generation.

With these advantages

leadership in Mohajans and Matbars has become arbitrary against which poor
villagers cannot do anything because of thinking of .their�sole dependence
or �ubsistence on them .

4

Sinha M. A. Sayeed , "Leadership in Village Development , " The
Bangladesh Observer , February 1 2 , 1 9 7 8 .
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But the danger of this type of leadership is that as Mohajans
and Matbars are generally not educated, cultured or well-infor:r.ed of
national development and problems , they become highly dependent on others .
Further , the input of the political system, i . e . , poljtical socilaization,
political recruitment , interest articulation, aggregation and political com'

munication, cannot be well-spread and well-rooted under this type of leadership .
On the other hand , the traditional and middle class leadership
are well-educated and consciou s .

The political system may work well if

they take vigorous steps to make: .tb'e ::policy of government a success .
The programs of the present government have ushered great hopes
and enthusiasm among the peopl e , especially the villagers .

But if leader-

ship in village areas is not constructive and benevolent , developmental
schemes wirlnot materialize.

Extension of the banking system , emphasis

on cottage industry , agricultural development , adequate credits to peasants
and other facilities should be extended to rural areas in order to hasten
the ' process: of�.dev�l�pmental activities .
(a) Leadership in village areas should be formed
in such a way so that all types of personalities
may take part in molding society;
(b) In case of leadership of the middle class it
should ask proper help from Mohajans, Matbars and
others . Similarly, Matbars and Mohajans should
extend their helping hands towards any develop
mental schemes .
(c) Village politics that create a hinderance to
development should be brought to play their
role in a constructive way and thus make develop
ment a success .
{d) Educationists, doctors, engineers and other pro
fessionals should go to villages which greatly helps
to create strong leadership in village development ,
because leadership is the product of environment also .
·

125
(e) Growing educated young generations may play
a very positive role in this field. With
stable and constructive development the
village people will be able to have the
fruits of political development . 5
Efforts should be made for the control o f corruption which ravages
every sector of the society.

Developmental programs are very much hampered

due to the widespread corruption.
steps in this respec t .

The present government has taken certain

For example ,

Post-Bangladesh public · leaders will have to submit
their property statements within 60 days from January
25 to the coordination control cell for national security.
Persons failing to submit the statement shall b e punished
with imprisonment for a term o f up to two years and may
also be disqualified for election or appointment to a
public off ice for a period from five to seven years
under the public leader s . ( Improper Acquisition of
Property : Reg{!iation. 1 977-MLR x of 1977)
But mere control o f the public officials will not solve the problem unless· efforts :are taken·_ to cbntrol .it .. in �every sector, especially the
bureaucracy, the police, the businessmen.
all these sectors.

It is really difficult to control

This can be controlled by peopl e ' s participation.

Peo-

ple should be vigilant to find out the corrupt elements and report to the
authority concerned .
Exports should be diversified.
increase of exports.

Efforts should be taken for the

President Ziaur Rahman called for creating a produc-

tion base that would enable the country to offer different::products , both
primary and manufactured for export to the world market.

6

The Bangladesh. Observer , September 4 , 1978 .
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The export earnings during 1976-77 reached the figure o f Taka
625 . 50 crore as against Taka 306 . 14 crore in 1974-75 and Taka 5 5 1 . 67

crore in 1975-7 6 .

7

This rise is no doubt encouraging but there is no

room for complacency as we have to pay about three times our export
earnings for making the payments on a heavy import bill on account of
the import of capital good s , machinery , raw materials and consumer good s .
These are some guidelines for the solution of the problems .
the actual solution of the problems is very difficult .

Unless society is

stabilized , no plan or solution of the problems will be successful.
should be taken for the stabilization of the society.

7

But

Sinha M. A . Sayeed, "Road to Developmen t , " The Bangladesh
Observer , September 1 2 , 1978 .
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